Background - Randall Pittman, a self-represented plaintiff, filed employment and related claims against multiple defendants in 2009–2010; several defendants moved to declare him a vexatious litigant under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 391(b). - Siemens filed a vexatious-litigant motion in March 2010; Pittman dismissed the action in April 2010; the trial court nevertheless granted the motion and issued a prefiling order on May 28, 2010. - Pittman repeatedly sought to strike or vacate the vexatious-litigant order, raising jurisdictional, voidness, extrinsic-fraud, collateral-estoppel, and timeliness arguments in multiple motions and appeals. - The trial court denied Pittman’s successive motions to vacate, concluding (among other things) that the court retained jurisdiction to decide the vexatious-litigant motion after dismissal, Pittman’s extrinsic-fraud claim was untimely and inadequately supported, and relief under § 473(d) was discretionary. - Pittman appealed; this appeal challenges the denial of his motion to vacate the May 28, 2010 vexatious-litigant order. The Court of Appeal affirmed. ### Issues | Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held | |---|---:|---|---| | Whether the trial court lacked jurisdiction to decide the vexatious-litigant motion after Pittman’s voluntary dismissal | Dismissal divested the court of jurisdiction, so the post‑dismissal vexatious order is void | Court and defendants: post‑dismissal orders addressing collateral statutory rights (like vexatious‑litigant/pre‑filing relief) fall within recognized exceptions and courts retain jurisdiction | Court held dismissal did not render the vexatious order void; courts may decide vexatious‑litigant motions after dismissal as collateral/ancillary matters and to prevent tactical escape from sanctions/future protection | | Whether Pittman’s claim of extrinsic fraud (attorney told him hearing was off calendar) rendered the order void | Pittman: opposing counsel told him hearing was cancelled; order procured by fraud and should be vacated | Defendants: fraud claim requires extrinsic evidence and timeliness; Pittman failed to present adequate proof or timely motion | Court held fraud claim needed extrinsic evidence and was asserted too late under § 473(d); equitable relief also denied for failure to show meritorious defense, excuse, and diligence | | Whether relief under § 473(d) and the court’s inherent powers required vacatur | Pittman sought vacatur as void under § 473(d) and equitable relief | Defendants: § 473(d) is discretionary and does not apply to non‑void orders; equitable relief requires strict elements | Court treated § 473(d) challenge de novo for voidness and abused‑discretion for relief; found no facial voidness and, even if equitable relief sought, Pittman failed to satisfy the three‑part test | | Whether trial court’s failure to follow § 1008 or reconsider prior minute order deprived it of power to vacate | Pittman: trial court lacked authority to vacate April 19 minute order because § 1008 motion for reconsideration requirements were not met | Defendants: issue was not properly raised below and is forfeited | Court found the § 1008 objection forfeited for failure to timely present it in the trial court and declined to reach it on appeal | ### Key Cases Cited Cruz v. Fagor America, Inc., 146 Cal.App.4th 488 (2007) (§ 473(d) allows court discretion to set aside void orders but only void orders may be set aside under the statute) Nixon Peabody LLP v. Superior Court, 230 Cal.App.4th 818 (2014) (distinguishes review standards: voidness reviewed de novo; decision to set aside reviewed for abuse of discretion) OC Interior Services, LLC v. Nationstar Mortgage, LLC, 7 Cal.App.5th 1318 (2017) (distinguishes orders void on face of record from those requiring extrinsic evidence and explains timing consequences) Ramos v. Homeward Residential, Inc., 223 Cal.App.4th 1434 (2014) (extrinsic‑evidence challenges to orders must comply with statutory time limits) Frank Annino & Sons Constr., Inc. v. McArthur Restaurants, Inc., 215 Cal.App.3d 353 (1989) (court may retain jurisdiction after dismissal to decide sanctions because the relief is collateral and meant to deter misconduct) Day v. Collingwood, 144 Cal.App.4th 1116 (2006) (post‑judgment sanctions motions are collateral and courts may decide them after dismissal) Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384 (1990) (federal Rule 11 sanctions may be imposed after voluntary dismissal; dismissal does not erase sanctionable conduct) Bravo v. Ismaj, 99 Cal.App.4th 211 (2002) (vexatious‑litigant/pre‑filing orders serve an ancillary protective function; may be appropriate even when action no longer pending) Rodriguez v. Cho, 236 Cal.App.4th 742 (2015) (equitable relief from orders for extrinsic fraud requires meritorious defense, satisfactory excuse, and diligence) Shalant v. Girardi, 51 Cal.4th 1164 (2011) (purpose of vexatious‑litigant statutes: curb misuse by repetitive, groundless litigants)