Pitt-Hart v. Sanford USD Medical Center, 878 N.W.2d 406

Background

Plaintiff Barry Pitt-Hart fell and was injured on November 11, 2009 while a Sanford patient; he alleges a Sanford patient-care technician dropped him while assisting him to bed after knee-replacement surgery.
Pitt-Hart received subsequent rehab and outpatient therapy at unaffiliated providers; Sanford provided some outpatient therapy through September 14, 2010.
Pitt-Hart sued Sanford on September 14, 2012, delivering a summons and complaint; Sanford answered and moved for summary judgment asserting SDCL 15-2-14.1 barred the claim.
The circuit court granted summary judgment for Sanford; Pitt-Hart appealed arguing (1) the claim is not governed by SDCL 15-2-14.1 because it is vicarious liability, (2) equitable tolling/estoppel should apply, and (3) the continuous-treatment rule tolls the period.
The Supreme Court of South Dakota considered whether SDCL 15-2-14.1 applies and whether its two-year period was tolled or delayed by continuing treatment or equitable doctrines.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does SDCL 15-2-14.1 apply to this suit against a hospital for an employee’s alleged negligence?	SDCL 15-2-14.1 should not apply to vicarious-liability claims against a hospital for acts of non-licensed employees; statute targets direct malpractice by listed practitioners.	The statute applies to any action against an enumerated defendant (e.g., a hospital) for malpractice, error, mistake or failure to cure, regardless of vicarious vs. direct liability.	Court held SDCL 15-2-14.1 applies: Sanford (a hospital) is an enumerated defendant and the alleged dropping is an "error"/"mistake" within the statute.
Is SDCL 15-2-14.1 a statute of limitation subject to tolling/estoppel?	The two-year period should be tolled under equitable estoppel/fraud principles because of Sanford’s conduct.	The statute is a fixed repose period not subject to tolling, estoppel, or fraudulent concealment.	Court reaffirmed SDCL 15-2-14.1 is a statute of repose; repose periods are not tolled by estoppel or fraud.
Does the continuous-treatment rule toll SDCL 15-2-14.1?	Continuous treatment (Sanford provided outpatient therapy through Sept. 14, 2010) tolls the period.	Continuous-treatment tolling applies to statutes of limitation, not to a statute of repose; also plaintiff received treatment from unaffiliated providers.	Court held continuous-treatment tolling inapplicable to this repose statute and, in any event, plaintiff’s care was not a continuous course by the same provider for the same negligent act.
Did the continuing-tort/continuing-wrong doctrine delay the start of the repose period?	Plaintiff implied ongoing injury justified delaying the repose period.	Defendant said injury resulted from a single identifiable act (being dropped), so repose began then.	Court held the injury arose from a single event (Nov. 11, 2009); the continuing-tort doctrine does not apply, so the two-year repose expired before suit.

Key Cases Cited

Peterson v. Burns, 635 N.W.2d 556 (S.D. 2001) (SDCL 15-2-14.1 is a statute of repose)
CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 134 S. Ct. 2175 (U.S. 2014) (distinguishes statutes of limitation from statutes of repose; repose not tolled by discovery or fraud)
Lewis v. Sanford Med. Ctr., 840 N.W.2d 662 (S.D. 2013) (treatment/occurrence analyses in hospital-vicarious-liability context)
Beckel v. Gerber, 578 N.W.2d 574 (S.D. 1998) (SDCL 15-2-14.1 is an occurrence rule—runs from negligent act)
Anson v. Star Brite Inn Motel, 788 N.W.2d 822 (S.D. 2010) (discusses equitable tolling recognition issues under South Dakota law)
Wells v. Billars, 391 N.W.2d 668 (S.D. 1986) (continuous-treatment/continuing-wrong discussion in medical-malpractice context)
Roberts v. Francis, 128 F.3d 647 (8th Cir. 1997) (continuing-tort doctrine does not apply when plaintiff can identify the specific negligent act)
Cunningham v. Huffman, 609 N.E.2d 321 (Ill. 1993) (repose measured from last culpable act; continuing negligence delays repose start)