Pit River Tribe v. Bureau of Land Management
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 12480
9th Cir.2015Background
- The Pit River Tribe and environmental groups challenged BLM’s May 18, 1998 decisions that vacated earlier five‑year extensions and instead granted up to 40‑year continuations for 26 unproven geothermal leases in the Glass Mountain Unit (Medicine Lake Highlands).
- The Tribe alleges geothermal development would harm sacred, cultural, environmental, recreational, and aesthetic interests and that BLM failed to satisfy statutory, NEPA, NHPA, and fiduciary duties.
- Under the Geothermal Steam Act (as in effect in 1998), §1005(a) authorized up to 40‑year continuations when commercial production exists (non‑discretionary), while §1005(g) allowed discretionary successive five‑year extensions (subject to NEPA/NHPA review). A unit agreement (Article 17.4) sometimes tied leases together operationally.
- BLM’s 1998 letters reversed prior grantings of five‑year extensions and retroactively continued the 26 leases for 40 years based on a unit‑agreement interpretation; BLM did not fully explain its changed statutory interpretation.
- The district court granted judgment on the pleadings: it found Pit River waived most statutory claims, concluded the Tribe lacked prudential (zone‑of‑interests) standing to challenge under §1005(a), and held §1005(a) left no discretion (so NEPA/NHPA/fiduciary claims failed).
- The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding the complaint also challenges BLM’s change to treat the leases as eligible for §1005(a) continuations instead of §1005(g) extensions; because §1005(g) is discretionary and requires NEPA/NHPA review (per Pit River I), Pit River’s claims fall within §1005(g)’s zone of interests and the dismissal was improper.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pit River may challenge BLM’s 1998 decision to treat leases as continued under §1005(a) rather than extended under §1005(g) | Pit River: the amended complaint challenges BLM’s change in legal interpretation and thus includes a §1005(g) claim (or an attack on the change of status), which is subject to NEPA/NHPA and tribal consultation | BLM: the operative claim is only under §1005(a); §1005(a) is nondiscretionary so environmental/tribal review is irrelevant and Pit River’s interests are outside that provision’s zone of interests | Court: Pit River did challenge BLM’s change; claims implicate §1005(g) and are not limited to §1005(a); remand required |
| Whether Pit River has a cause of action under the APA (zone‑of‑interests) to challenge the lease decision | Pit River: its cultural, environmental, and tribal interests are "arguably" within the interests protected by the provision governing discretionary extensions (§1005(g)) | BLM: Tribe’s interests are not within the zone of interests of §1005(a) continuation provision and thus not reviewable under APA | Court: zone‑of‑interests analysis must consider the particular statutory provision challenged; because the complaint challenges application of §1005(g) as well, Pit River’s interests fall within §1005(g)’s zone of interests |
| Whether §1005(a) is discretionary so that NEPA/NHPA and fiduciary duties apply | Pit River: if BLM improperly treated leases as §1005(a) continuations when they were eligible only for §1005(g) extensions, NEPA/NHPA/fiduciary duties apply because §1005(g) is discretionary | BLM: §1005(a) is mandatory/non‑discretionary; thus NEPA/NHPA and fiduciary duties do not attach to continuations | Court: §1005(a) is nondiscretionary, but because the complaint challenges BLM’s switch from §1005(g) to §1005(a), NEPA/NHPA/fiduciary claims cannot be dismissed at the pleadings stage; if §1005(g) governs, those duties apply (per prior Ninth Circuit precedent) |
| Whether the district court properly entered judgment on the pleadings on the statutory merits | Pit River: merits should be litigated; factual and legal issues remain about statutory interpretation and unit agreement effect | Defendants: dismissal appropriate because plaintiffs lack prudential standing and §1005(a) applies | Court: reversed and remanded; merits require factual development and primary review by the district court |
Key Cases Cited
- Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (zone‑of‑interests is a cause‑of‑action question to be resolved by statutory interpretation, not a jurisdictional prudential standing barrier)
- Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Serv., 469 F.3d 768 (9th Cir. 2006) (Pit River I) (holding BLM must complete NEPA and NHPA review before granting discretionary five‑year extensions under §1005(g))
- Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154 (1997) (zone‑of‑interests is assessed with respect to the particular statutory provision relied upon)
- Match‑E‑Be‑Nash‑She‑Wish Band v. Patchak, 132 S. Ct. 2199 (2012) (reaffirming APA zone‑of‑interests framework)
- Ass’n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (formulation of the zone‑of‑interests test)
- Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987) (description of the zone‑of‑interests test and its modest demands)
- Dep’t of Transp. v. Public Citizen, 541 U.S. 752 (2004) (explaining when a statutory provision is nondiscretionary)
- Geo‑Energy Partners‑1983 Ltd. v. Salazar, 613 F.3d 946 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing the Geothermal Steam Act’s purpose and unit plan provisions)