492 P.3d 586
N.M.2021Background
- In June 2020 the New Mexico Legislative Council (the Council) issued a directive forbidding on-site public attendance at a June 18 special legislative session called in part to address COVID-19 impacts; the session was webcast under existing legislative rules and allowed limited in-person media access and live public comment online.
- Petitioners (mostly legislators and one private citizen, Dunn) sought a writ of mandamus from the New Mexico Supreme Court asking the Court to declare the Council’s ban on in-person attendance unconstitutional under Article IV, § 12 ("All sessions of each house shall be public") and under due process principles.
- The Court considered standing arguments and exercised discretion to confer standing on Dunn under the ‘‘great public importance’’ doctrine; standing of the legislative petitioners was not dispositive because a single party with standing suffices.
- The majority analyzed whether the Council had statutory authority to issue the directive (sections 2-3-3, -4, -5): it concluded the Council’s broad delegated operational control over the Capitol, including duties for the "safety, care and preservation" of buildings and grounds, reasonably encompassed pandemic-related decisions limiting in-person attendance.
- On the constitutional claims the Court (majority) rejected the procedural-due-process theory (legislative sessions are legislative, not adjudicative, so classical due-process notice-and-hearing protections do not apply) and declined to grant mandamus under Article IV, § 12 because the bare word "public" is ambiguous historically and textually; petitioners’ plain-text-only argument failed to establish a clear legal duty warranting mandamus.
- A dissent would have read Article IV, § 12 to require in-person public access (and would have concluded the Council lacked authority to exclude the public), but the majority declined to adopt the dissent’s historical analysis sua sponte and denied the writ.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standing to bring mandamus | Dunn & legislator-petitioners claimed injury from exclusion and sought relief | Council challenged standing; Court can proceed if at least one party has standing | Court exercised discretion to grant Dunn standing on public-importance grounds; standing sufficed to reach merits |
| Council's statutory authority to bar in-person attendance | Petitioners: Council’s operational powers are custodial only and do not authorize closing legislature or eliminating public access | Council: statutes (§§2-3-3, -4, -5) give broad operational control, including safety, care and preservation, and can reasonably authorize temporary bans to protect public safety | Majority: directive fell within the Council’s broad operational authority; mandamus not warranted on authority ground |
| Article IV, § 12 ("All sessions of each house shall be public") | Petitioners: "public" plainly requires in-person physical access to legislative sessions; directive unconstitutionally closed the session | Council: "public" is ambiguous historically; webcast, published journals, live online public comment and media access satisfy publicness; Court should not read into the clause an unargued historical standard | Majority: the term "public" is ambiguous at ratification-era usage; petitioners presented only a plain-text claim and failed to show a clear constitutional duty to compel relief; mandamus denied; dissent would have found in-person access required |
| Procedural due process (right to participate) | Petitioners: exclusion denied citizens notice and opportunity to participate in legislative process | Council: legislative acts are prospective/political and not subject to individual procedural-due-process hearing requirements; remedy is political, not judicial | Court: rejected due-process claim — legislative/ rule-making decisions do not trigger adjudicative due-process protections; mandamus denied |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (legislature’s broad authority to set internal procedures is generally nonjusticiable except where rules violate constitutional restraints)
- Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (public-health emergency precedents that afford deference to reasonable public-health measures)
- Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441 (1915) (no individualized procedural-due-process right where government action is general and legislative in nature)
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (textualist guidance: constitutional words should be given their ordinary public meaning at adoption)
- Sarkes Tarzian, Inc. v. Legislature of the State of Nevada, 765 P.2d 1142 (Nev. 1988) (denying mandamus to invalidate legislature’s closed-committee procedures where constitution provided no clear mandate to the contrary)
- State ex rel. Richardson v. Fifth Judicial Dist. Nominating Comm’n, 160 P.3d 566 (N.M. 2007) (mandamus is an extraordinary remedy that requires a clear legal right and duty)
- LC & S, Inc. v. Warren County Area Plan Comm’n, 244 F.3d 601 (7th Cir. 2001) (recognizing the limits of a constitutional due-process right in the legislative rulemaking context)
- O’Bannon v. Town Court Nursing Ctr., 447 U.S. 773 (1980) (discussing when due-process protections attach and the diminished need for individual hearings when action affects broad groups)