345 P.3d 13
Wash. Ct. App.2015Background
- Piris was charged in 1997 with three counts of first degree rape of a child based on acts when he was 13; SCRAP represented him.
- He pled guilty in 1998 to two counts, with a standard sentencing range of 159–211 months.
- At sentencing in 1999, the court denied an exceptional sentence and imposed the bottom of the standard range at 159 months.
- Appellate counsel Nielsen challenged the error in offender-score calculation that affected the standard range, leading to a 2000 per curiam vacatur and remand for resentencing, but Piris was never resentenced.
- Piris was released in 2010; in 2012 a probation violation led to a new 146-month sentence; Piris then sued Kitching, SCRAP, Nielsen, Nielsen firm, and later King County for legal malpractice.
- The trial court granted summary judgment dismissing Piris’s claim on the basis of the “actual innocence” requirement, which the court said Piris could not satisfy because he pleaded guilty and did not claim innocence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether actual innocence is required to pursue criminal malpractice claims, and whether Powell creates a narrow exception. | Piris argues Powell I/II carve a narrow exception to innocence. | Defendants contend innocence required under Falkner/Ang governs; Powell exception is narrow and inapplicable. | Powell exception not extended to this case; actual innocence required. |
| Whether the sentencing error here is sufficiently analogous to Powell to permit the exception. | Piris asserts Powell-like relief since error affected sentence length. | Piris’s sentence did not exceed statutory maximum; Powell's facts are distinct. | Powell distinguishable; exception not available. |
| Whether miscalculation of offender score rendering a sentence within the correct standard range defeats the innocence exception. | Incorrect offender score caused longer sentence; publics policy favors exception in rare cases. | Correct range still permitted; 159 months lies within correct range; no excess beyond lawful maximum. | Sentencing within correct range does not justify the exception. |
| Whether postconviction relief considerations affect the innocence requirement here. | Not decisive; court sticks to narrow Powell-based rule. |
Key Cases Cited
- Falkner v. Foshaug, 108 Wn. App. 113 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (innocence requirement based on public policy reasons)
- Ang v. Ang, 154 Wn.2d 477 (Wash. 2005) (actual innocence required for criminal malpractice plaintiffs)
- Powell v. Associated Counsel for Accused, 125 Wn. App. 773 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005) (affirmed requirement to prove actual innocence; Powell I)
- Powell v. Associated Counsel for Accused, 131 Wn. App. 810 (Wash. Ct. App. 2006) ( Powell II; narrow exception discussed)
- Owens v. Harrison, 120 Wn. App. 909 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004) (carved no exception to innocence requirement for sentencing issues)
- In re Pers. Restraint of Goodwin, 146 Wn.2d 861 (Wash. 2002) (sentence error and innocence principles in broader context)
- Johnson v. Johnson, 131 Wn.2d 558 (Wash. 1997) (procedural context related to postconviction relief)