835 F.3d 180
1st Cir.2016Background
- Pippin (executive housekeeper) and Parker (assistant executive housekeeper) worked at Boulevard-owned Comfort Inn in South Portland; they and another female employee reported sexual harassment by a maintenance worker to the general manager in April 2010.
- HR investigated; the maintenance worker received a written reprimand on May 11, 2010; no further discipline followed.
- In June 2010, Pippin and Parker each sent unsolicited written statements to HR recounting co-workers’ concerns that management had protected the harasser and pressured witnesses.
- Both plaintiffs were terminated in 2011 and sued in state court in 2014 alleging retaliation under the Maine Whistleblowers’ Protection Act (MWPA) and the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA); Boulevard removed the cases to federal court.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Boulevard, applying a pre-Harrison “job duties exception” to find the plaintiffs’ reports were not protected; the First Circuit reversed, remanding for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiffs’ reporting constituted protected activity under the MWPA | Their initial report plus later unsolicited letters show a course of conduct opposing employer’s unlawful harassment, not merely job duties | Plaintiffs only passed along the victim’s complaint and gave information as part of job duties; no evidence of oppositional motive | Reversed: jury could reasonably find their conduct was oppositional and thus protected under MWPA (Harrison controls) |
| Whether plaintiffs engaged in protected activity under MHRA §4633 (opposition clause) | Their reports and post-investigation letters opposed employer’s handling of unlawful harassment and therefore qualify as opposition | The reporting only related to cooperating with an investigation and not opposition to unlawful practice; job duties preclude protection | Reversed: same analysis as MWPA; a reasonable jury could find oppositional motivation and thus protection under MHRA |
| Whether summary judgment was appropriate given the record | Plaintiffs contend disputed facts about motive require trial | Boulevard contends no genuine dispute on motive; district court’s job-duties ruling was dispositive | Summary judgment improper: factual dispute over motive precludes disposing of protected-activity element as a matter of law |
Key Cases Cited
- Harrison v. Granite Bay Care, Inc., 811 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2016) (job-duties do not categorically defeat MWPA protection; motive matters)
- Walsh v. TelTech Sys., Inc., 821 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 2016) (standard for reviewing summary judgment and construing facts for nonmovant)
- Collazo v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Mfg., Inc., 617 F.3d 39 (1st Cir. 2010) (oppositional conduct can be shown by purposive conduct; Title VII context)
- DeMasters v. Carilion Clinic, 796 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2015) (broad view of oppositional conduct under anti-retaliation law)
- Miranda-Rivera v. Toledo-Dávila, 813 F.3d 64 (1st Cir. 2016) (summary judgment: genuine dispute exists when a jury can reasonably interpret evidence for nonmovant)
- CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685 (U.S. 2011) (jurors may rely on common sense and experience inferences)
- Rubinovitz v. Rogato, 60 F.3d 906 (1st Cir. 1995) (appellate courts must draw all reasonable inferences for opposing party on summary judgment)
