457 P.3d 393
Utah Ct. App.2019Background
- A long-standing fence and row of trees (the Fence/Trees) separated a drive‑in theater’s parcel (the Property) from adjacent land; owners treated the Fence as the boundary for decades though the recorded deeds described a different line.
- Drive‑In sold the Property to Developer in 2001; Developer’s boundary search led it to believe the Fence/Trees were off its parcel. Pioneer later bought parts of the Property in 2007 and 2016.
- TaxHawk acquired the adjacent northern parcels in 2006 and 2010; its deeds described a boundary that included the strip with the Fence/Trees (the Disputed Strip). Parties generally treated the Fence as the boundary until TaxHawk tried to remove it in 2016.
- Pioneer filed the First Suit (quiet title, alleging boundary by acquiescence). TaxHawk moved for summary judgment, arguing Pioneer lacked title and could not tack Developer’s possession because Developer knew the true record boundary; court granted summary judgment to TaxHawk, reasoning Pioneer never received a deed from the predecessor.
- Pioneer later obtained a quitclaim deed from the Drive‑In (2017) and filed the Second Suit (quiet title based on that deed). The court consolidated suits, dismissed the Second Suit as claim precluded, and granted TaxHawk summary judgment on its quiet‑title counterclaim while barring Pioneer’s boundary‑by‑acquiescence defense.
- Pioneer appealed; the Court of Appeals affirmed the first summary judgment (insufficient opposing evidence), reversed the dismissal of the Second Suit (deed was a new operative fact), and reversed the bar on Pioneer’s defense — remanding for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Pioneer) | Defendant's Argument (TaxHawk) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Does the appellate court have jurisdiction over Pioneer’s appeal of the First Suit summary judgment? | The First Suit order was not a Rule 54(b) certification and so need not have been appealed immediately. | The order labeled "Final Judgment" required immediate appeal even if Rule 54(b) was attempted. | Court has jurisdiction: the order lacked Rule 54(b) language/findings, so it was not an immediate certification and appeal was timely. |
| 2. Was a deed a necessary element of Pioneer’s boundary‑by‑acquiescence claim such that summary judgment for TaxHawk was proper? | A deed is not strictly required; title vests by operation of law when boundary‑by‑acquiescence elements are met. Pioneer had predecessor possession evidence. | Pioneer failed to show transfer of title to it; without evidence of transfer (deed or other privity/operation of law) Pioneer cannot defeat summary judgment. | Affirmed: Pioneer failed to carry its burden at summary judgment to show a genuine issue on transfer/privity—court properly entered judgment for TaxHawk. The court acknowledged deed is not the sole possible transfer method (Q‑2) but Pioneer produced no evidence of any transfer to it. |
| 3. Was Pioneer’s Second Suit (quiet title based on a quitclaim deed obtained after the First Suit) barred by claim preclusion? | Obtaining the quitclaim deed after the First Suit was a new operative fact/transaction; res judicata does not bar claims that arise after the first complaint. | Pioneer could and should have obtained the deed during the First Suit (e.g., via procedural tools) and thus the claim was precludable. | Reversed: obtaining the quitclaim deed was a new material operative fact that arose after the First Suit; under the transactional test the Second Suit was not claim precluded. |
| 4. Could Pioneer assert boundary by acquiescence as an affirmative defense to TaxHawk’s quiet‑title counterclaim after the Second Suit was dismissed as precluded? | The defense is substantively different (simply denies TaxHawk’s title) and should be allowed if not actually precluded. | A barred claim cannot be repackaged as an affirmative defense; the defense mirrors the precluded claim. | Reversed: because the court erred in dismissing the Second Suit on claim preclusion, it also erred in barring Pioneer’s boundary‑by‑acquiescence defense; defense must be considered on remand. |
Key Cases Cited
- Q–2 LLC v. Hughes, 368 P.3d 86 (Utah 2016) (title vests by operation of law when boundary‑by‑acquiescence elements are satisfied; vesting can be transferred by grant, descent, adverse possession, or other operation of law)
- Brown v. Peterson Dev. Co., 622 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1980) (successor asserted title acquired by predecessor via boundary by acquiescence only after predecessor conveyed by quitclaim deeds)
- Gillmor v. Family Link, LLC, 284 P.3d 622 (Utah 2012) (Utah adopts the Restatement transactional test for claim identity in res judicata analysis)
- Macris & Assocs., Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000) (claims required for res judicata are those that arose before filing the earlier complaint)
- Copper Hills Custom Homes, LLC v. Countrywide Bank, FSB, 428 P.3d 1133 (Utah 2018) (Rule 54(b) certifications require an express determination with supporting findings)
- Clark v. Archer, 242 P.3d 758 (Utah 2010) (improper Rule 54(b) certifications generally must be appealed immediately)
- Anderson v. Fautin, 379 P.3d 1186 (Utah 2016) (elements of boundary by acquiescence outlined: visible line, mutual acquiescence, 20‑year period, adjoining landowners)
- Salo v. Tyler, 417 P.3d 581 (Utah 2018) (summary judgment burdens: nonmoving party who will bear burden at trial must present affirmative evidence to create a genuine issue)