Pink, B. v. UPMC Presbyterian Shadyside
752 WDA 2015
| Pa. Super. Ct. | Jul 14, 2016Background
- Plaintiff Benjamin Pink, a patient with autism and intellectual disabilities, was involuntarily committed to WPIC in August 2010 and alleged two inpatient falls in October 2010 (one patellar fracture and one elbow fracture) with no eyewitnesses.
- Pink sued WPIC for negligence in 2012; WPIC asserted immunity under the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA) and moved for summary judgment in 2015. The trial court granted summary judgment; Pink appealed.
- The MHPA (50 Pa.C.S. § 7114) bars civil liability for treatment decisions and related care unless there is gross negligence or willful misconduct.
- Plaintiff relied on an expert report (Dr. Merikangas) alleging negligence and reckless disregard causing two falls; the report did not identify how falls occurred or provide factual support linking WPIC conduct to injuries.
- Record showed routine monitoring: individualized treatment plan, daily psychiatric notes, nursing fall precautions, prompt medical evaluation, x‑ray and orthopedic consults after the first injury, and transfer of an allegedly abusive roommate.
- Plaintiff also argued destroyed/absent 24‑hour staff notes warranted an adverse inference; the court found no evidence of improper destruction or that the missing notes would likely show gross negligence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Whether summary judgment was improper because evidence showed gross negligence or willful misconduct | Pink: facts and expert report show WPIC grossly deviated from standard of care in protecting and treating him | WPIC: MHPA immunity applies absent gross negligence/willful misconduct; record shows ordinary care and prompt treatment | Court: Affirmed summary judgment — plaintiff failed to show gross negligence or willful misconduct |
| 2. Whether plaintiff’s expert report established a prima facie case of gross negligence | Pink: Dr. Merikangas’s report shows negligence and reckless disregard causing two falls | WPIC: Expert opinion lacked factual basis, was speculative and did not connect WPIC conduct to injuries | Court: Expert opinion insufficient (conjecture), so causation/gross negligence not established |
| 3. Whether Hamil/Restatement §323 theory made WPIC liable for failing an undertaking | Pink: WPIC had duty under §323/Hamil and its failures caused injuries | WPIC: MHPA immunity supersedes ordinary‑negligence theories; Hamil/§323 address ordinary negligence only | Court: MHPA immunity controls; Hamil/§323 do not negate need to prove gross negligence |
| 4. Whether destruction of 24‑hour staff notes entitled plaintiff to adverse inference | Pink: WPIC policy of destroying notes destroyed evidence, justifying adverse inference | WPIC: No record evidence of improper or intentional destruction or that notes would show gross negligence; daily progress notes exist | Court: No basis for adverse inference; trial court did not abuse discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Farago v. Sacred Heart Gen. Hosp., 562 A.2d 300 (Pa. 1989) (MHPA immunity extends to institutions providing psychiatric care)
- Albright v. Abington Mem’l Hosp., 696 A.2d 1159 (Pa. 1997) (defines gross negligence under MHPA as conduct flagrantly deviating from ordinary care)
- Downey v. Crozer‑Chester Med. Ctr., 817 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. 2003) (court may decide as a matter of law that evidence only supports ordinary negligence, not gross negligence)
- Bloom v. DuBois Reg’l Med. Ctr., 597 A.2d 671 (Pa. Super. 1978) (earlier definition of gross negligence adopted by Albright)
- Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991) (corporate‑negligence doctrine — hospital duties and knowledge required for liability)
- Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978) (proximate cause and causation standards; necessity of expert proof when issues beyond common knowledge)
- Potts v. Step By Step, Inc., 26 A.3d 1115 (Pa. Super. 2011) (distinguishes Thompson negligence analysis from gross negligence requirement under MHPA)
- Gillingham v. Consol Energy, Inc., 51 A.3d 841 (Pa. Super. 2012) (expert opinion must have an adequate factual basis; opinions based on mere possibilities are incompetent)