Pineda-Liberato v. People
2017 CO 95
| Colo. | 2017Background
- Defendant Karla Pineda-Liberato pleaded guilty to one felony theft and received a two-year deferred judgment and sentence with conditions including payment of $1,520.45 restitution, ~48 hours community service, and $1,572.60 in fees/costs (later increased by transport fees).
- After detention by immigration authorities, a revocation complaint was filed (2007) but never adjudicated; in 2013 the People withdrew the revocation complaint and the court terminated probation as completed, triggering withdrawal of the plea and dismissal with prejudice.
- At termination, Pineda-Liberato had paid $992 total, leaving $815.95 unpaid restitution and ~$1,905 in unpaid fees/costs (including added transport fees).
- The district court ruled it lacked authority to collect unpaid restitution after dismissal but allowed the victim to collect civilly; it later vacated unpaid costs/fees because no statute preserved them post-dismissal.
- The Colorado General Assembly then amended restitution statutes (effective March 7, 2014) to clarify that restitution orders survive termination of deferred judgments; the Supreme Court accepted the interlocutory transfer to resolve pre-2014 cases lingering in limbo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether court may collect unpaid restitution after completion/dismissal of deferred sentence | State: restitution order is a final civil judgment that remains in force until paid; court retains authority to collect | Pineda-Liberato: completion and dismissal withdraw plea and terminate obligations, so restitution cannot be enforced by court | Court: Affirmed — restitution order survives and court may collect unpaid restitution |
| Whether court may collect unpaid court costs and fees after completion/dismissal of deferred sentence | State: various statutes authorize collection of specified fees and costs; court can collect after dismissal | Pineda-Liberato: no statutory provision like restitution statute preserves fees after dismissal; court lacks authority | Court: Reversed — fees/costs do not survive dismissal absent explicit statutory language |
| Effect of People v. Carbajal (Carbajal II) dicta on survival of restitution | Pineda-Liberato: Carbajal II implies probationary obligations (including restitution) end with deferral termination | State: Carbajal II was limited/unique and its statements re restitution were dicta; statutes show restitution survives | Court: Carbajal II dicta disavowed; statutes (and later 2014 amendments) control |
| Retroactivity / legislative intent of 2014 amendments clarifying restitution | Pineda-Liberato: amendments show legislature simply clarified pre-existing law in line with Carbajal II | State: amendments demonstrate Legislature disagreed with Carbajal II and intended restitution survival; they apply prospectively and clarify intent | Court: Legislature’s 2014 amendments confirm restitution survives termination; but decision on pre-2014 statutory meaning reaches same result for restitution |
Key Cases Cited
- People v. Carbajal, 198 P.3d 102 (Colo. 2008) (explains nature and limits of deferred judgments and probation-like conditions)
- People v. Carbajal, 312 P.3d 1183 (Colo. App. 2012) (discussed as a division opinion with unique facts; its dicta on restitution disavowed)
- In the Interest of J.E.S., 817 P.2d 508 (Colo. 1991) (a court with jurisdiction has authority to enforce its orders)
- Doubleday v. People, 364 P.3d 193 (Colo. 2016) (standard for de novo statutory interpretation invoked)