371 N.C. 707
N.C.2018Background
- Plaintiff Patricia Pine fell at work on December 29, 2011, landing on her right wrist/hand, right shoulder, left knee, and neck; she treated with multiple orthopedists and underwent right carpal tunnel release.
- Employer filed a Form 60 admitting compensability for “Right shoul[d]er/arm” only; later denied compensability for cervical spine and other conditions.
- The Full Commission credited several treating experts and concluded, citing the Parsons presumption (admissions under Form 60), that plaintiff’s carpal tunnel, sagittal band rupture, carpal boss, left knee, neck, and related conditions were causally related to the work injury and awarded medical and disability benefits.
- After the Commission issued its award, the legislature amended N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) to state that a Form 60 admission does not create a presumption of causation for conditions not identified on the form; that amendment could apply to pending claims.
- The Court of Appeals affirmed: it agreed the Commission erred to the extent it applied Parsons to unlisted conditions but held the Commission alternatively made independent findings (preponderance of the evidence) of causation. A dissent argued the award relied solely on the presumption and was unclear.
- The Supreme Court reversed and remanded to the Court of Appeals for further remand to the Commission because the record does not clearly show whether the Commission’s award rested on the Parsons presumption or independent findings; the constitutional challenge to retroactive application of the statute was dismissed as improvidently allowed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Form 60 admission (Parsons presumption) may be applied to conditions not listed on the Form 60 after the 2017 amendment to N.C.G.S. § 97-82(b) | Pine argued the Commission could apply the presumption to her additional conditions as it did | Wal‑Mart argued the statutory amendment bars presumption for conditions not identified on the Form 60 | Court declined to decide constitutionality; remanded because unclear whether Commission relied on presumption (statute potentially applicable) |
| Whether the Commission made independent findings of causation by a preponderance of the evidence (so remand unnecessary) | Pine maintained the Commission alternatively found causation on the merits without relying on Parsons | Wal‑Mart argued the award relied on the presumption and did not show plaintiff carried the burden on the merits | Supreme Court: record is unclear; remand required for clarification and further findings |
| Adequacy/competence of expert causation testimony (Drs. Getter and Koman) | Pine relied on those experts to establish causation beyond presumption | Wal‑Mart argued their opinions were speculative/post hoc and thus incompetent | Court of Appeals majority found the expert testimony competent; Supreme Court did not resolve this and remanded for further proceedings |
| Whether retroactive application of amended § 97-82(b) violates due process | Pine argued retroactive application would violate substantive due process | Wal‑Mart argued the amendment applies and is valid as applied | Supreme Court dismissed the constitutional claim as improvidently allowed and expressed no opinion; plaintiff may raise it later |
Key Cases Cited
- Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540 (establishing presumption of causation from employer admission under Form 60)
- Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 369 N.C. 730 (recognizing Parsons presumption and prompting legislative amendment)
- Perez v. Am. Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128 (discussing application of Parsons presumption)
- Gonzalez v. Tidy Maids, Inc., 239 N.C. App. 469 (addressing rebuttal of Parsons presumption)
- Deese v. Champion Int’l Corp., 352 N.C. 109 (standards for reviewing Commission findings)
- Ballenger v. ITT Grinnell Indus. Piping, Inc., 320 N.C. 155 (award must be set aside if Commission acted under misapprehension of law)
- Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227 (cautioning against treating temporal sequence alone as proof of causation)