Pine v. Wal-Mart Assocs., Inc., 255 N.C. App. 321

Background

On Dec. 29, 2011 Patricia Pine fell at work, injuring her right shoulder/arm and complaining of neck, right wrist/hand, and left knee pain; Wal‑Mart filed a Form 60 admitting compensability for the right shoulder/arm only.
Pine received treatment including EMG, carpal tunnel release, shoulder and cervical evaluations, and surgeons (Drs. Comadoll, Getter, Koman) diagnosed rotator cuff tear, cervical degenerative disease aggravated by the fall, carpal tunnel, sagittal band rupture, and possible meniscal knee injury.
The Industrial Commission awarded Pine medical compensation and ongoing disability for the shoulder (admitted) and for the additional conditions, applying the Parsons presumption to treat non‑listed conditions as presumed related.
Defendants appealed, arguing the Parsons presumption could not be applied to conditions not listed on the Form 60, and that Pine failed to prove causation without the presumption.
While the appeal was pending the General Assembly amended N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97‑82 to abrogate Wilkes (which had extended Parsons to non‑listed conditions), making clear a Form 60 does not create a presumption for injuries not identified on the form and that employees must request a hearing to prove causation.
The Court of Appeals held the Commission erred in invoking Parsons as extended by Wilkes, but affirmed the award because the Commission separately found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Pine had proved causation for the additional conditions.

Issues

Issue	Pine's Argument	Wal‑Mart's Argument	Held
Whether Parsons presumption applies to conditions not listed on Form 60	Parsons (and Wilkes) entitle Pine to a rebuttable presumption that additional treatment is causally related	Parsons/Wilkes do not apply to conditions not listed on Form 60 after the 2017 statutory amendment	Court: Applying Parsons here was error because the legislature abrogated Wilkes; Form 60 does not create the presumption for non‑listed conditions
Whether the Commission’s Parsons error requires reversal	Not reversible if Commission also made independent findings proving causation by a preponderance	Error requires remand because burden should have been on Pine, not shifted	Court: No reversal; award affirmed because Commission separately found Pine proved causation by preponderance (alternative basis)
Whether medical testimony constituted competent evidence of causation	Treating physicians’ opinions (Getter, Koman, Comadoll) established causation to reasonable degree of medical certainty	Opinions were speculative/post hoc and insufficient	Court: Testimony was competent and supported findings; Carr and precedent distinguish Young; Findings of causation supported by competent evidence
Effect of 2017 amendment to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97‑82 on pending claims	Amendment clarifies Wilkes was abrogated; employees cannot rely on Form 60 presumption for unlisted conditions	Same as Pine: statute controls and eliminates presumption for non‑listed injuries	Court: Amendment applies retroactively to pending claims and made Commission’s Parsons application erroneous, but alternative factual findings saved the award

Key Cases Cited

Parsons v. Pantry, Inc., 126 N.C. App. 540 (1997) (established rebuttable presumption that additional treatment for a previously‑found compensable injury is causally related)
Perez v. Am. Airlines/AMR Corp., 174 N.C. App. 128 (2005) (extended Parsons presumption where employer admitted compensability via Form 60)
Wilkes v. City of Greenville, 799 S.E.2d 838 (N.C. 2017) (held Form 60 admission entitled employee to Parsons presumption; subsequently abrogated by statute)
Carr v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (Caswell Ctr.), 218 N.C. App. 151 (2012) (affirmed Commission where it independently found causation by preponderance of evidence apart from Parsons)
Young v. Hickory Bus. Furn., 353 N.C. 227 (2000) (expert causation based solely on post hoc reasoning is incompetent evidence)