Pine Tree Villa, LLC v. Carl Brooker, 612 F. App'x 340

In 2007 Helen Elfrig executed a "Durable Unlimited Power of Attorney" naming Joy Brooker as attorney‑in‑fact; the POA stated Brooker had "the maximum power under law" to perform any acts Elfrig could do personally and "including the power to make any health decisions on my behalf."
In October 2010, upon Elfrig's admission to Regis Woods Care, Brooker signed a voluntary arbitration agreement on Elfrig's behalf; the agreement was explicitly optional and not a condition of admission.
Elfrig died in the facility in 2011; Carl Brooker, administrator of Elfrig’s estate, sued the nursing home in state court for negligence and wrongful death.
The nursing‑home defendants filed in federal district court under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) to enforce the arbitration agreement and sought to enjoin the state action; the estate moved to dismiss.
The district court, relying on Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, held the POA did not authorize Brooker to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement because the POA expressly limited authority to making health decisions, and dismissed the FAA action with prejudice.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed, concluding Kentucky law construes POAs that enumerate specific powers as limiting—even where general language asserts "maximum" or "full" power—and that a voluntary arbitration agreement is not a health‑care decision absent a contractual admission requirement.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Elfrig's POA authorized her attorney‑in‑fact to enter a voluntary arbitration agreement	POA granted "maximum power" to do any acts Elfrig could do personally, so Brooker could sign the arbitration agreement	POA only expressly authorized health‑care decisions; Kentucky law limits POA authority to enumerated acts absent explicit contracting authority	POA did not authorize entry into a voluntary arbitration agreement; arbitration not enforceable against estate
Whether Ping controls and is distinguishable	Plaintiffs: Ping is distinguishable because Elfrig's POA is "unlimited"	Defendants: Ping involved similar general language; Kentucky requires specific authorization for significant legal consequences	Ping applies; similar language was construed narrowly in Ping
Whether Kentucky recognizes truly unlimited POAs	Plaintiffs: Kentucky permits unlimited POAs (Ingram)	Defendants: Ingram concerned a "general power" within a specified category, not unlimited authority to do all acts	Kentucky law does not support unconstrained, all‑purpose POAs; Ingram is not on point
Whether applying Ping is preempted by the FAA as hostile to arbitration	Plaintiffs: enforcing Ping frustrates FAA policy favoring arbitration	Defendants: the decision rests on state‑law agency/POA construction, not hostility to arbitration	No preemption; state‑law limits on agent authority are neutral and permissible under FAA

Ping v. Beverly Enterprises, 376 S.W.3d 581 (Ky. 2012) (Kentucky Supreme Court construes POA authority as limited to expressly enumerated powers; voluntary arbitration not a health‑care decision)
Ingram v. Cates, 74 S.W.3d 783 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002) (POA granting a general power to convey personal property is not equivalent to an unlimited all‑purpose POA)
City of Louisa v. Newland, 705 S.W.2d 916 (Ky. 1986) (contract interpretation principle: instruments construed as a whole to give effect to all parts)
Kottmyer v. Maas, 436 F.3d 684 (6th Cir. 2006) (standard of review for Rule 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) dismissals)
DLX, Inc. v. Kentucky, 381 F.3d 511 (6th Cir. 2004) (standards for appellate review of dismissal)
Johnson Associates Corp. v. HL Operating Corp., 680 F.3d 713 (6th Cir. 2012) (de novo review of denial of a motion to compel arbitration)