Pinder v. State
217 So. 3d 130
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Andre Pinder was convicted in 1991 of armed burglary, two counts of aggravated battery, two counts of aggravated assault, and one count of simple assault; he is serving life plus 40 years.
- The crimes occurred May 17, 1989: after church members contacted police about prior vandalism/theft, Pinder and two others returned and shot/wounded two members and assaulted two others with a firearm.
- Trial court imposed an upward departure sentence, explaining the offense punished victims who had called police.
- Pinder previously appealed; this court affirmed in Pinder I, 591 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992), and the Florida Supreme Court denied review.
- Pinder filed multiple post-conviction suits (eight to this Court); he now contends the upward departure was improper because it relied on an uncharged “threat” (invoking Walker and State v. Varner).
- The Third DCA concluded Pinder’s claim misreads Pinder I, his petition is successive/abusive, and ordered the clerk to refuse further pro se filings related to his case unless signed by counsel.
Issues
| Issue | Pinder's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pinder may continue to file pro se pleadings challenging his conviction/sentence | Pinder says he has good cause to pursue successive claims attacking the upward departure | Pinder’s petitions are successive, abusive, and misuse habeas to relitigate resolved issues | Court barred further unauthorized pro se filings on this case absent counsel review/signature |
| Whether upward departure was improper because it relied on an uncharged threat under §914.22 | Pinder: departure was based on “threatening a witness,” a charge he was never charged/convicted of, so sentence illegal | State: departure rested on violent conduct (shooting/assault) and motive (punishment for calling police), not mere uncharged threats | Court: Pinder misreads Pinder I; upward departure validly based on violent conduct/motivation, not on an uncharged §914.22 threat |
| Whether later disapproval of Walker by State v. Varner requires vacatur of Pinder I | Pinder: Pinder I relied on Walker; Varner disapproved Walker, so Pinder I is erroneous | State: retroactive application of later appellate change is not ground to vacate a final order; Pinder I is law of the case | Court: change in law (Varner) not a basis to disturb final judgment; Pinder I remains controlling |
Key Cases Cited
- Pinder v. State, 591 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (affirming conviction and addressing grounds for upward departure)
- State v. Varner, 616 So. 2d 988 (Fla. 1993) (disapproving Walker)
- Walker v. State, 496 So. 2d 220 (Fla. 3d DCA 1986) (relied on in Pinder I)
- Spencer v. State, 751 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 1999) (standards for restricting repetitive inmate filings)
- Jimenez v. State, 196 So. 3d 499 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016) (access-to-courts forfeiture when judicial process abused)
- Whipple v. State, 112 So. 3d 540 (Fla. 3d DCA 2013) (permitting courts to refuse further filings after notice and opportunity to respond)
- Petrysian v. Metro. Gen. Ins. Co., 672 So. 2d 562 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996) (later change in law not ground to vacate final order)
- Thornton v. State, 963 So. 2d 804 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (law of the case discussion)