PINDER v. ORTIZ, 2:14-cv-02989

Pinder, a black male, was reassigned from teacher’s aide to school police officer and accused of using excessive force on Feb 20–22, 2013; Vice Principal Ortiz issued a 204-form and Ortiz terminated him March 20, 2013; Deputy Superintendent Kihn sent a termination letter April 24, 2013.
A School Reform Commission hearing affirmed the termination (hearing May 30, 2013; decision Aug 22, 2013); Pinder’s appeal to the Philadelphia Court of Common Pleas was denied Jan 13, 2014.
While internal appeals were pending, Pinder filed a City of Philadelphia Human Relations Commission complaint alleging race and sex discrimination on Aug 5, 2013.
Pinder sued the School District, Ortiz, and Kihn under Title VII, the PHRA, and the Equal Protection Clause, alleging discrimination and retaliation; Ortiz and Kihn moved to dismiss Count II (PHRA claims) as to them.
The court examined whether individual liability under PHRA § 955(e) requires pleading scienter/common purpose and whether PHRA retaliation claims were timely‑connected to protected activity.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether individual supervisors can be liable under PHRA § 955(e) for discrimination	PHRA permits suits against supervisors; Ortiz and Kihn participated in creating and carrying out discriminatory policy	Individual liability requires specific pleading of scienter/common purpose and cannot be inferred	Denied dismissal: allegations that Ortiz and Kihn created/carried out discriminatory policy permit reasonable inference of scienter/common purpose; PHRA discrimination claim against individuals survives
Whether PHRA retaliation claims against Ortiz and Kihn survive dismissal	Pinder argues he engaged in protected activity (filed HRC complaint Aug 5, 2013) and suffered retaliatory acts by defendants	Defendants argue adverse actions (terminations, appeal) occurred before protected activity and thus cannot be retaliatory; later actions not attributable to them	Granted dismissal: acts by Ortiz and Kihn occurred before Aug 5, 2013 or were not shown to be taken by them in retaliation, so PHRA retaliation claims against individuals fail

Dici v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1996) (supervisors may be liable under PHRA if they share employer’s discriminatory intent)
Morse v. Lower Merion School District, 132 F.3d 902 (3d Cir. 1997) (on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, courts accept complaint allegations and reasonable inferences as true)
Kachmar v. SunGard Data Sys., Inc., 109 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 1997) (elements required to establish a prima facie retaliation case under Title VII/PHRA)