Pike v. Budd, 133 F.4th 74

Samantha Pike, a licensed alcohol and drug treatment counselor employed by Wellspring, Inc., worked at Maine’s Adult Treatment and Recovery Court (TRC), overseen by Judge Charles Budd, Jr.
At a mandatory out-of-state conference, Judge Budd made unwelcome sexual advances towards Pike, which continued upon returning to Maine in the TRC courthouse.
Budd was in a position to impact Pike’s duties and the Wellspring contract through his role as presiding judge of TRC, giving him significant supervisory authority over Pike’s work environment.
Pike brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim against Budd, alleging violation of her Equal Protection rights due to a hostile work environment created by his conduct.
The district court dismissed Pike’s complaint, holding Budd was entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established for this context (state official harassing a private contractor).
On appeal, the First Circuit vacated the dismissal, holding Pike had plausibly alleged a violation and the right was clearly established, remanding for further proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Budd acted under color of state law	Budd’s authority over Pike as TRC judge meant state action, even if Pike was employed by a private entity	Budd argued actions at conference were personal, not under color of law, as Pike was a private employee	Budd acted under color of state law via position/authority
Sufficiency of sexual harassment allegations	Pike suffered severe and pervasive harassment forming a hostile work environment	Budd said conduct was verbal, not severe/pervasive, and thus not actionable	Allegations are sufficient to plausibly allege harassment
Individual § 1983 liability in this context	A state actor is individually liable even absent direct employment, if they create the hostile environment	Only employers can be liable for such claims, not individuals or non-employers	Individual liability applies if acting under state authority
Entitlement to qualified immunity	Law was clearly established that a state official cannot create a sex-based hostile work environment	No clear precedent involving state actor and private worker; not clearly established	Law was clearly established; qualified immunity denied

West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42 (1988) (state official’s misuse of authority constitutes action under color of state law)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (facial plausibility required for pleadings to survive dismissal)
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002) (official can have notice of unconstitutionality in novel circumstances)
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (sex-based discrimination by state actor is unconstitutional)
Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742 (1998) (supervisor’s power heightens severity of harassing conduct)
Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421 (2013) (framework for hostile work environment claims)
Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17 (1993) (standard for evaluating hostile work environment claims)
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (hostile work environment can constitute unlawful discrimination)
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (qualified immunity depends on clearly established law)
Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194 (2004) (qualified immunity assessed in light of specific facts)
Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21 (1991) (individual state officials subject to § 1983 liability)
Starnes v. Butler Cnty. Ct. of Common Pleas, 971 F.3d 416 (3d Cir. 2020) (hostile work environment violates § 1983)