Pierre v. Holder, 738 F.3d 39

Pierre, born in Haiti to unmarried parents Lavaud and Marie, was raised apart from his mother and lived in the United States with his father since 1993 as a lawful permanent resident.
Lavaud naturalized in 1992; Pierre’s § 1433 naturalization attempt was filed in 1994 but its disposition is not shown; Marie formally disclaimed parental rights in the 1994 filing.
In 2001 Pierre was convicted of two counts of robbery; in 2006 he was convicted of sale of a controlled substance and weapons possession, leading to removal proceedings.
The IJ found Pierre removable and denied derivative citizenship; the BIA affirmed removal and denied derivative citizenship under § 1432(a)(3).
The BIA later granted CAT relief for torture concerns, but Pierre’s derivative citizenship claim under § 1432(a)(3) remained the central issue on review.
The court holds that Pierre was not entitled to derivative citizenship under § 1432(a)(3) and that the denial did not violate equal protection.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does § 1432(a)(3) discriminate based on legitimacy?	Pierre argues legitimacy-based discrimination violates equal protection.	Government contends § 1432(a)(3) is not illegitimate discrimination and serves valid aims.	No illegitimate discrimination; statute withstands intermediate scrutiny.
Does § 1432(a)(3) discriminate based on gender?	Pierre argues gender-based distinction harms out-of-wedlock children when the mother is not the naturalizing parent.	Government argues Nguyen-based justification allows gender distinctions to reflect relationships and legitimation events.	Gender Classification justified; Nguyen framework applies; upheld.
Should the constitutional avoidance canon be used to construe § 1432(a)(3) in Pierre's favor?	Pierre urges construal or extension via avoidance to grant derivative citizenship.	Government says no ambiguity; avoidance not applicable; statute unambiguous and constitutional as applied.	Canon not applied; no reinterpretation; avoidance rejected.
Does § 1432(a)(3) satisfy intermediate scrutiny given government interests?	Pierre argues the statute should be invalid or broadened.	Government contends interests in family integrity and parental rights are substantial and related to the distinction.	Yes; substantial relation to important governmental objectives; statute upheld.

Brissett v. Ashcroft, 363 F.3d 130 (2d Cir. 2004) (legal separation requires formal act; informal separation not sufficient)
Lewis v. Gonzales, 481 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2007) (legal separation not satisfied by custody alone; birth events matter)
Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (Supreme Court 2001) (immigration/naturalization classifications can justify relaxed scrutiny)
Barthelemy v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2003) (recognizes context-specific derivation issues in § 1432(a))
Wedderburn v. INS, 215 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2000) (discusses legitimate interests in context of § 1432(a))
Grant v. DHS, 534 F.3d 102 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholds gender-based distinctions where legitimation is considered)
Ayton v. Holder, 686 F.3d 331 (5th Cir. 2012) (applies heightened scrutiny in gender discrimination in naturalization context)