Pierre v. FJC Security Services, Inc.
1:15-cv-04627
E.D.N.YSep 19, 2017Background
- Plaintiff Jean-Gespere Pierre, pro se, sued employer FJC Security Services under Title VII alleging sex discrimination and retaliation after workplace disputes and complaints involving female coworker Tiffany Murray and several supervisors.
- Key incidents: May 29, 2014 (complaint about Murray leaving post/lunch log); July 31, 2014 (locker-room and logbook dispute; NYPD report); August 15, 2014 (confrontation with Supervisor Lloyd; disciplinary notice); November 8, 2014 (loud confrontation with Supervisor Lloyd, escorted out by Shelter police).
- Plaintiff filed Human Rights Division complaints in June and August 2014; the Human Rights Division found no probable cause.
- FJC terminated Pierre on November 12, 2014 after the Shelter banned him for his November 8 conduct and for violating company conduct policies.
- FJC moved for summary judgment; the district court evaluated whether Pierre engaged in protected activity and whether termination was motivated by sex-based discrimination or retaliation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Pierre engaged in Title VII–protected activity (opposition to sex discrimination) | Pierre contends he complained about sex-based preferential treatment toward Murray and reported misconduct to FJC, NYPD, and Human Rights Division | FJC argues complaints asserted a "paramour preference" (romantic favoritism) and disputes about coworkers, not actionable sex discrimination | Court held complaints were complaints about paramour preference/ interpersonal disputes, not opposition to an unlawful practice under Title VII, so not protected activity |
| Whether termination was discriminatory (sex-based disparate treatment) | Pierre says he was fired because supervisors favored Murray due to romantic interest and he was not the beneficiary | FJC contends termination followed legitimate grounds: Shelter ban and Pierre’s policy-violating conduct on Nov. 8, 2014 | Court held plaintiff failed to show discrimination based on sex; paramour-preference is not actionable under Title VII; prima facie discrimination not established |
| Whether termination was retaliatory and/or pretextual | Pierre argues firing was retaliation for protected complaints | FJC argues termination was for nondiscriminatory, legitimate reasons (safety/conduct violations); termination not causally linked to complaints; record supports conduct-based firing | Court granted summary judgment for FJC; even assuming prima facie case, FJC offered legitimate reason and Pierre failed to show pretext |
| Whether pro se plaintiff should be allowed leave to amend complaint | Pierre implicitly seeks relief from dismissal via pro se status | FJC opposes (motion for summary judgment) | Court denied leave to amend as futile because defects (paramour-preference not actionable; lack of pretext evidence) cannot be cured by amendment |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (standard for genuine issue of material fact at summary judgment)
- Kelly v. Howard I. Shapiro & Assocs. Consulting Eng’rs, P.C., 716 F.3d 10 (2d Cir. 2013) (rejects paramour-preference as sex discrimination; requires reasonable belief for protected opposition)
- Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (discusses McDonnell Douglas framework and retaliation elements)
- DeCintio v. Westchester Cty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304 (2d Cir. 1986) (earlier Second Circuit recognition that paramour preference is not actionable sex discrimination)