154 So. 3d 1174
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Pierre Imbert was convicted of lewd or lascivious exhibition (over 18) and lewd or lascivious battery and sentenced to six years’ imprisonment plus five years’ sex-offender probation with electronic monitoring.
- At sentencing, the State presented testimony about an uncharged, factually similar incident investigated by an officer; that case did not proceed because the victim and her mother declined to prosecute.
- Defense counsel objected to consideration of the uncharged conduct; Imbert denied those allegations and was allowed to respond at sentencing.
- The trial court acknowledged it may consider "other relevant factors" and did not make a formal ruling on the objection, but stated it considered Imbert’s lack of criminal history, the case facts, and the scoresheet when imposing sentence.
- Imbert appealed, arguing (inter alia) that the trial court’s consideration of the uncharged crime violated due process and rendered his sentence illegal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a sentencing court may consider uncharged crimes | Imbert: uncharged crimes should never be considered at sentencing; due process violation | State: court may consider other relevant factors, including related uncharged or pending matters | Court: rejected per se ban; court may consider uncharged crimes if Norvil-type safeguards are met |
| Whether the uncharged incident here was admissible for sentencing | Imbert: officer’s testimony about the uncharged incident was improper and unreliable | State: incident was similar, supported by investigative evidence, and Imbert had chance to rebut | Held: incident was relevant, supported by testimony, and Imbert had opportunity to explain — admissible for sentencing |
| Whether the court gave undue weight to the uncharged conduct | Imbert: sentencing was infected because court relied on the uncharged allegations | State: sentencing record shows reliance on lawful factors (lack of history, facts, scoresheet) | Held: record does not show undue emphasis on the uncharged crime; court did not rely on it to impose sentence |
| Whether consideration of the uncharged conduct rendered sentence illegal (standard of review) | Imbert: sentencing error requiring reversal | State: no due process violation; sentence within statutory range and lawful | Held: de novo review; no sentencing error; judgment and sentence affirmed |
Key Cases Cited
- Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (U.S. 1949) (sentencing judge may consider fullest information about defendant when imposing sentence)
- Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (U.S. 1980) (consideration of relevant factors at sentencing does not violate constitutional rights)
- Dowling v. State, 829 So. 2d 368 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002) (sentencing courts may consider other relevant factors)
- Whitehead v. State, 21 So. 3d 157 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (pending charges related to the crime being sentenced may be considered)
- Bracero v. State, 10 So. 3d 664 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (wide discretion in factors a court may consider at sentencing)
- Jansson v. State, 399 So. 2d 1061 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (court must avoid placing undue emphasis on unproven allegations at sentencing)
- Elias v. State, 286 N.W.2d 559 (Wis. 1980) (uncharged offenses can be considered as evidence of a pattern of behavior in sentencing)
- Denson v. State, 915 P.2d 284 (Nev. 1996) (district court should not punish defendant for uncharged crimes; use them only to assess character)
- United States v. Weston, 448 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1971) (sentencing process should not become a second trial; other criminal conduct may be considered)