Pierce v. Vaughan, 191 Vt. 607

Defendants Vaughan and Zambón purchased Northland Specialties, Inc. from plaintiffs Pierce for $175,000, with $30,000 borrowed from plaintiffs and the balance paid at closing.
A promissory note required repayment of $30,000 in three annual installments, starting April 2007.
Plaintiffs filed suit in February 2007 alleging two verbal post-sale agreements to supply materials and to compensate labor, plus breach and wage damages.
Default judgment was entered May 9, 2007 after defendants failed to timely respond to the complaint, despite defendants’ later efforts to respond being prepared but not filed.
In January 2008, after mediation in a second suit, the parties reached a settlement; the mediation addendum preserved defendants’ rights to raise defenses in other actions, but did not waive rights related to the default judgment.
In May 2010 plaintiffs sought trustee process to collect the default judgment; defendants moved for relief under Rule 60(b), and the trial court granted relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether 60(b)(6) relief can bypass time limits for relief under other subsections	Pierce argues 60(b)(6) cannot substitute for 60(b)(1)-(3).	Vaughan/Zambón contend the mediation addendum permits relief under 60(b)(6).	Relief under 60(b)(6) cannot override the one-year limits of the other subsections.
Whether the defaults relief fell within 60(b)(1) (mistake or inadvertence) and was timely	Relief should have been barred by untimeliness; the mistake was not properly addressed within a year.	The failure to respond could be treated as mistake/inadvertence warranting relief.	Grounds fell under 60(b)(1) but the one-year limit barred relief via 60(b)(6) as a backdoor.
Whether the mediation agreement’s addendum precluded relief under Rule 60(b)	Addendum was designed to allow future 60(b) relief, not preclude it.	The addendum shows parties intended relief in future actions under 60(b).	Addendum did not preclude relief from the default judgment under 60(b); the Court still could not uphold relief under 60(b)(6).

Waitt v. Waitt, 137 Vt. 374 (1979) (discretionary standard for Rule 60 relief; abuse of discretion required for reversal)
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 149 Vt. 365 (1988) (Rule 60(b) relief liberally construed but not a substitute for subsections (1)-(3))
R. Brown & Sons, Inc. v. Int’l Harvester Corp., 142 Vt. 140 (1982) (limits on relief under Rule 60(b) and need for timely filing)
Olde & Co. v. Boudreau, 150 Vt. 321 (1988) (denying untimely 60(b) relief where ground fell under (3))
Alexander v. Dupuis, 140 Vt. 122 (1981) (60(b)(6) relief not applicable to substitute for other grounds)
Perrott v. Johnston, 151 Vt. 464 (1989) (avoidance of backdoor extensions of time limits under 60(b))
Goshy v. Morey, 149 Vt. 93 (1987) (requirement that 60(b) relief be supported by proper reasoning and findings)
Downtown Barre Dev. v. GU Mkts. of Barre, LLC, 2011 VT 45 (2011) (interpretation of contract language and plain meaning governs outcomes)