Pierce v. State Ex Rel. Department of Public Safety
2014 OK 37
| Okla. | 2014Background
- On Oct. 31, 2010 Phillip Ryan Pierce was arrested for DWI; he requested an administrative hearing to contest license revocation on Nov. 1, 2010.
- Officer Justin Hewett (the arresting/testifying officer) was scheduled for National Guard deployment in 2011; the Department of Public Safety (DPS) delayed hearings citing his unavailability.
- Hewett was available to testify in person for at least five months after Feb. 2011 and could have been produced on an emergency basis for an additional three months; he deployed to Kuwait in July 2011 and returned by April 2012.
- Despite timely request and periods when the officer was available (and alternatives such as telephonic testimony or preserving testimony), DPS did not hold the administrative hearing until June 8, 2012 — ~20 months after arrest.
- The hearing resulted in a 180-day suspension; Pierce appealed to district court, which vacated the suspension on speedy-trial grounds; the Court of Civil Appeals reversed; the Oklahoma Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a ~20-month delay in scheduling the administrative revocation hearing violated the Oklahoma constitutional right to a speedy remedy (Okla. Const. art. 2, §6) | Pierce: the delay was unreasonable and caused prejudice because his property interest (license) was left in limbo; DPS had sufficient time to hold or preserve testimony | DPS: delay was justified by witness unavailability and by budget/personnel/docket constraints | Held: Violation — under the unique facts the 20‑month delay (when witness was available for months and could have testified remotely or via preserved testimony) denied Pierce a speedy hearing; license reinstated |
| Allocation of responsibility for delay | Pierce: DPS deliberately postponed knowing witness would deploy; driver acted promptly | DPS: factors outside its control (witness deployment, limited resources) justified delay | Held: Delay weighed against DPS — evidence showed deliberate postponement and available alternatives, so responsibility rests with DPS |
| Whether Pierce’s failure to raise the speedy-trial claim at the administrative hearing bars review | Pierce: no obligation to assert at administrative hearing; timely requested the hearing | DPS: trial court lacked jurisdiction because claim not presented to administrative hearing | Held: Trial court had jurisdiction to review constitutional speedy-trial claim on appeal; failure to assert earlier did not preclude review given public‑interest protections and property interest at stake |
| Prejudice required to show denial of speedy remedy | Pierce: living under threat of losing license is prejudicial per se | DPS: Pierce offered no direct evidence of prejudice, so claim fails | Held: Some prejudice was established — the prolonged uncertainty over a protected property interest satisfied the prejudice factor here |
Key Cases Cited
- Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (four-factor balancing test for speedy-trial claims)
- DeLancy v. Caldwell, 741 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1984) (delay alone can deprive due process)
- State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Mothershed, 264 P.3d 1197 (Okla. 2011) (application of Barker factors in civil disciplinary context)
- Price v. Reed, 725 P.2d 1254 (Okla. 1986) (driver's license is a protected property interest entitled to due process)
- Ellis v. State, 76 P.3d 1131 (Okla. Cr. 2003) (governmental delay weighs against the state)