Pierce v. Ducey, 1 CA-CV 22-0007

The Enabling Act (1910) conditioned Arizona statehood on adherence to directives, including that proceeds from granted school trust lands form a permanent fund for education and that changes to investment/distribution required congressional consent.
Congress amended the Enabling Act several times; a 1999 federal amendment referenced Arizona Const. art. 10, § 7 as governing distributions.
Arizona voters approved Proposition 118 (2012) and Proposition 123 (2016), the latter setting distributions at 6.9% of the five‑year average market value of the Fund.
Michael Pierce sued in federal court challenging Prop. 123; the Ninth Circuit found his federal claim lacked Article III standing and that Congress mooted the dispute by consenting to the change in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (2018).
Pierce then sued in Maricopa County Superior Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief; the superior court entered declaratory judgment that the 1999 amendment did not eliminate the congressional‑consent requirement and awarded attorney fees.
The State appealed; the Court of Appeals concluded congressional action mooted the controversy, vacated the superior court judgment and fee award, and remanded for dismissal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the dispute is moot after Congress consented in 2018	Pierce argued the federal consent represented voluntary cessation and did not moot the core legal question about the 1999 amendment	State argued Congress’s 2018 consent ended the controversy and mooted the case	Mootness: case mooted by Congress’s action; superior court erred to the extent it relied on voluntary cessation
Whether the voluntary‑cessation exception applies	Pierce asserted the Governor’s request for consent constituted voluntary cessation preventing mootness	State said federal legislative action, not state cessation, resolved the issue	Voluntary‑cessation exception did not apply because federal action, not state discontinuance, produced the change
Whether the court should decide if the 1999 amendment repealed the consent requirement	Pierce sought a declaratory ruling that the 1999 amendment did not eliminate congressional consent	State opposed declaratory resolution absent a live controversy	Court declined to decide the 1999‑amendment question because the dispute was moot
Entitlement to attorney fees under private‑attorney‑general doctrine	Pierce claimed fees after prevailing in superior court	State argued no fee award if judgment vacated	Fees vacated — Pierce not prevailing party on appeal

Pierce v. Ducey, 965 F.3d 1085 (9th Cir. 2020) (federal appeal addressing standing and congressional consent mooting the dispute)
Gladden Farms, Inc. v. State, 129 Ariz. 516 (Ariz. 1981) (Enabling Act as Arizona’s fundamental law)
Workman v. Verde Wellness Ctr., 240 Ariz. 597 (App. 2016) (defining mootness standard)
Thomas v. City of Phoenix, 171 Ariz. 69 (App. 1991) (declaratory relief requires existing facts)
Hunt v. Richardson, 216 Ariz. 114 (App. 2007) (justiciable controversy standard)
Pointe Resorts, Inc. v. Culbertson, 158 Ariz. 137 (Ariz. 1988) (voluntary‑cessation doctrine discussed)
Cave Creek Unified Sch. Dist. v. Ducey, 233 Ariz. 1 (Ariz. 2013) (private‑attorney‑general fee principles)