Picnic Point Preservation Committee v. Snohomish County
76645-7
Wash. Ct. App.May 29, 2018Background
- Regatta Estates plat (recorded 1996) included multiple county-imposed plat restrictions; Restriction 9 limited Lot 1 to remain essentially a native growth protection area (NGPA) except for a single homesite and required county approval for site development.
- Shergar (the declarant) recorded CCRs in 1996 with a recital incorporating plat restrictions and a specific Section 7.1 stating Lot 1 was an oversized lot the declarant intended to subdivide in the future and containing a no-protest clause forbidding lot owners from objecting to such future subdivision if consistent with applicable regulations.
- Frognal acquired Lot 1 and adjacent parcels, combined them, and applied to subdivide into a larger new subdivision, asking Snohomish County to strike Restriction 9 from the Regatta Estates plat as part of the process.
- Picnic Point Preservation Committee and the Regatta Estates Homeowners Association opposed, arguing Restriction 9 operated as a restrictive covenant that could not be altered without signatures of all parties subject to the covenant (per RCW 58.17.215).
- The Hearing Examiner and County Council rejected Picnic Point’s interpretation; Snohomish County Superior Court affirmed. Picnic Point appealed; the Homeowners Association did not join the appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Restriction 9 is a restrictive "covenant" under RCW 58.17.215 such that alteration requires signatures of all parties subject to the covenant | Restriction 9, incorporated by the CCRs recital, is a covenant restricting Lot 1 and thus requires signatures under RCW 58.17.215 | Restriction 9 is a county-imposed plat restriction, not an immutable covenant; Section 7.1 of the CCRs expressly contemplates future subdivision and contains a no-protest clause | Court held Restriction 9 is not a restrictive covenant for purposes of RCW 58.17.215; the specific language in Section 7.1 prevails and permits alteration without signatures |
| Standing to appeal under land use statutes and RAP 3.1/RAP 2.4 | Picnic Point claimed associational standing through the Homeowners Association member; thus Picnic Point was an aggrieved party | County and Frognal argued Picnic Point lacked standing and was not an aggrieved party on appeal | Court denied motion to dismiss; Picnic Point had associational standing because it represents a member (the Homeowners Association) affected by the decision |
| Proper interpretation of CCR recital vs. specific operative clause (Section 7.1) | Recital incorporating plat restrictions makes Restriction 9 operative as a covenant | Specific operative language in Section 7.1 (intent to subdivide and no-protest clause) creates a specific exception and controls over the general recital | Court applied contract/covenant interpretation principles: where recital conflicts with a specific provision, the specific prevails; Section 7.1 shows intent to allow subdivision, defeating restrictive-covenant reading |
| Attorney fees on appeal | Picnic Point sought later briefing on fees | Respondents requested fees in their briefs under RCW 4.84.370 | Court granted respondents’ request for attorney fees on appeal; denied piecemeal briefing request |
Key Cases Cited
- Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 137 Wn.2d 683 (interpretation of restrictive covenants follows contract principles)
- Green v. Normandy Park, 137 Wn. App. 665 (restrictive covenant language is a question of law for the court)
- Sethre v. Wash. Educ. Ass'n, 22 Wn. App. 666 (preambles/recitals considered only to resolve ambiguity unless they state a promise)
- Mayer v. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 80 Wn. App. 416 (specific contractual provisions prevail over general ones)
- McGarv v. Westlake Invs., 99 Wn.2d 280 (same: specific controls general)
- Save a Valuable Envt. v. City of Bothell, 89 Wn.2d 862 (associational standing: an association has standing if a member would have standing)