Picard v. Magliano, 42 F.4th 89

NYPL § 215.50(7) criminalizes, within 200 feet of a courthouse, calling aloud, shouting, or displaying signs "concerning the conduct of a trial being held in such courthouse."
Michael Picard stood on a Bronx public sidewalk with a "Jury Info" sign and distributed flyers encouraging "Google Jury Nullification." A state court officer arrested him under § 215.50(7).
A Bronx ADA declined to prosecute because the arresting officer did not measure Picard’s distance from the courthouse; Picard then sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.
The district court found § 215.50(7) content‑based and not narrowly tailored, held it violated the First Amendment, and entered a permanent facial injunction barring enforcement in any circumstance.
On appeal the State argued lack of standing and that the injunction was overbroad; the Second Circuit held Picard had standing but vacated the facial injunction and remanded for a narrower, as‑applied injunction limited to Picard’s conduct.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge § 215.50(7) (pre/post‑enforcement)	Picard’s prior arrest, intent to repeat protected advocacy, and reasonable fear of prosecution establish injury in fact.	The statute does not plausibly reach Picard’s leafletting and generic advocacy, so no credible threat of prosecution.	Picard has Article III standing: his conduct is "arguably proscribed," prior arrest and reasonable fear suffice.
Scope of relief — facial injunction vs as‑applied relief	The statute is content‑based and facially unconstitutional; entire provision must be invalidated.	Even if some applications are unconstitutional (e.g., Picard’s), the statute may be valid in others that protect judicial integrity; relief should be limited as‑applied.	The district court abused its discretion by enjoining the statute in all circumstances; vacated facial injunction and remanded to enjoin only application to conduct like Picard’s.
Content‑based restriction / narrow tailoring	The statute is not narrowly tailored and reaches non‑disruptive, protected speech.	The statute furthers the compelling interest of protecting fair administration of justice and could be narrowly tailored in some contexts (e.g., loud, targeted attempts to influence jurors).	The court agreed the statute advances a compelling interest but found the record insufficient to resolve narrow‑tailoring in all contexts; therefore limited relief appropriate.

Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149 (pre‑enforcement standing when conduct is "arguably proscribed")
Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289 (standard for pre‑enforcement challenges)
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Article III standing requirements)
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. 155 (content‑based regulation triggers strict scrutiny)
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (states may restrict picketing near courthouses to protect administration of justice)
Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (upholding speech restrictions in sensitive locations like polling places)
United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (public sidewalks are traditional public fora)
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (plaintiff need not risk prosecution to seek declaratory relief)