Piazza v. Kellim
377 P.3d 492
| Or. | 2016Background
- Decedent Martha Delgado, a 17-year-old foreign exchange student, was shot and killed while waiting in line on the public sidewalk outside the Zone, an underage nightclub in Portland.
- The Zone admitted patrons ages 16–21; the nightclub and surrounding downtown entertainment district had a documented history of violent incidents, including prior shootings and frequent assaults in lines outside clubs.
- Plaintiff sued the Zone owners (premises defendants) and Rotary organizations (sponsor/supervisor defendants), alleging (inter alia) negligent failure to provide adequate security and, for Rotary, negligent supervision of exchange students.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under ORCP 21 A(8), arguing the particular shooting (a targeted attack by a mentally ill assailant) was a ‘‘random spree shooting’’ not reasonably foreseeable as a matter of law.
- The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s dismissal; the Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the Court of Appeals, holding the complaint alleged facts that could permit a jury to find the shooting was a reasonably foreseeable type of violent assault.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether plaintiff alleged a foreseeable risk of the kind of harm that befell Delgado (foreseeability as a legal limit on liability) | Allegations of prior violent incidents at and near the Zone, the club’s known vulnerability (lines, underage patrons), and publicity put defendants on notice of a generalized risk of violent assault | The particular crime was an unpredictable, random spree shooting; foreseeability cannot be premised on general crime statistics or dissimilar past events — too attenuated as a matter of law | Allegations were sufficient at pleading stage: a reasonable trier of fact could find a foreseeable risk of violent assault to patrons waiting in line outside the club; dismissal reversed and case remanded |
| Whether defendants’ special relationships altered the foreseeability analysis (premises/invitee; supervisory relationship) | Zone had possessory duty to invitees to guard against foreseeable third-party criminal acts; Rotary had heightened duty as supervisor/parental surrogate | Defendants did not dispute the existence of relationships but argued foreseeability remained lacking | Court treated both relationships as imposing duties limited to reasonably foreseeable criminal acts; plaintiff’s facts sufficed for both relationships at pleading stage |
| Proper level of generality for characterizing the foreseeable risk | Risk should be described at a generalized level (types of incidents/injuries), not the precise sequence leading to harm | Risk must be described with sufficient particularity (e.g., gang-, drug-, or alcohol-related violence); too broad a characterization (all violent assaults) improperly expands liability | Court adopted a relatively broad characterization here — "violent assault" — given location, history of assaults (including shootings), and specific allegations that the shooter targeted teens at that site |
| Whether prior case law (e.g., Buckler, Chapman) requires dismissal where prior acts are dissimilar or remote | Plaintiff: prior decisions permit jury questions when generalized evidence shows the location posed a risk of the kind of incident that occurred | Defendants: Buckler and Chapman show courts must require greater similarity/recency/frequency; otherwise liability would be unbounded | Court distinguished Buckler/Chapman facts and concluded those cases did not compel dismissal here; factual similarities (history of assaults/gun violence at/near Zone, publicity, club characteristics) sustain a plausible claim |
Key Cases Cited
- Fazzolari v. Portland School Dist. No. 1J, 303 Or. 1 (Or. 1987) (foreseeability is a blended factual/normative inquiry; courts should describe risk generally by reference to plaintiff’s theory)
- Stewart v. Jefferson Plywood Co., 255 Or. 603 (Or. 1969) (courts must gatekeep extreme or highly unusual chains of events; foreseeability may be framed as the generalized setting for injury)
- Buckler v. Oregon Corrections Div., 316 Or. 499 (Or. 1993) (mere facilitation of an unintended result by leaving an opportunity for crime does not make the resulting third-party criminal act foreseeable as a matter of law)
- Chapman v. Mayfield, 358 Or. 196 (Or. 2015) (plaintiff must describe the type of harm with reference to factual circumstances; generalized evidence may be insufficient if it fails to connect to the defendant’s conduct)
- Uihlein v. Albertson’s, Inc., 282 Or. 631 (Or. 1978) (possessors of land may have a duty to protect invitees from foreseeable criminal acts when the place or character of business or past experience warns of such risk)
- Hefty v. Comprehensive Care Corp., 307 Or. 247 (Or. 1988) (foreseeable risks must be described to capture the generalized incidents related to the defendant’s tortious conduct, not merely the end result)
- Oregon Steel Mills, Inc. v. Coopers & Lybrand, LLP, 336 Or. 329 (Or. 2004) (liability limited when intervening market forces, unrelated to defendant’s negligence, are the harm-producing force)