917 F.3d 161
3rd Cir.2019Background
- Piasecki was convicted in Pennsylvania state court of possession of child pornography and sentenced (Apr. 26, 2010) to 3 years’ county probation; the sentence included sex-offender supervision and a 10-year registration notation.
- After sentencing, Pennsylvania replaced Megan’s Law III with SORNA (effective 2012), which automatically subjected prior registrants (including Piasecki) to expanded requirements; Piasecki was designated Tier III and required in-person registration every three months for life plus numerous in-person updates for various life changes.
- Piasecki’s probation and supervisory conditions expired April 26, 2013; he filed a § 2254 habeas petition on Dec. 4, 2014 challenging his conviction while subject only to SORNA registration requirements.
- The District Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, finding Piasecki was not “in custody” and that registration requirements were collateral, not part of the judgment of sentence.
- The Third Circuit granted COA and reversed, holding SORNA’s in-person, frequent, and criminally-enforced registration obligations constituted custody and were imposed pursuant to the state-court judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SORNA registration constituted "in custody" for § 2254 jurisdiction | Piasecki: SORNA’s quarterly lifetime in-person registration, mandatory in-person updates, travel/reporting constraints, criminal penalties, and internet/computer limits are severe physical restraints not shared by public | Commonwealth: Registration are collateral, remedial reporting requirements imposed by legislation (not state-court judgment) and do not restrict freedom to live, work, or travel | Held: Yes — SORNA’s requirements are severe, immediate, physical restraints not shared by public and thus satisfy “in custody” |
| Whether those restraints were imposed "pursuant to the judgment of a State court" | Piasecki: Registration attached to his sentence (court sheet and mandatory sex-offender conditions), and SORNA applied to prior registrants by operation of law as a direct consequence of his conviction | Commonwealth: SORNA requirements arose later by statute, so they are legislative collateral consequences not part of original judgment | Held: Yes — state court documents included registration; Pennsylvania case law treats registration as part of judgment and SORNA applied to prior registrants as direct consequence of conviction |
| Whether immediate criminal penalties and severity satisfy custody test (severity/immediacy/not shared) | Piasecki: Felony penalties for failure to report, lifetime quarterly in-person reporting, and other compelled in-person duties make constraints severe and immediate | Commonwealth: Argued less weight; framed as non-custodial collateral duties | Held: Yes — court applied its Ross three-part test (severe, immediate, not shared) and concluded SORNA meets all three |
| Whether recognizing registration as custody would render "in custody" meaningless | Commonwealth: Allowing registration to confer habeas jurisdiction would swamp custody requirement | Piasecki: Narrow application here (severe, punitive, included in judgment) | Held: Court limited ruling to severe, punitive, physical restraints imposed pursuant to judgment; collateral non-physical consequences remain outside habeas custody |
Key Cases Cited
- Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236 (1963) (parole conditions can constitute custody for habeas jurisdiction)
- Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (release on recognizance with court-ordered restraints can be custody)
- Barry v. Bergen County Probation Dept., 128 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 1997) (community-service/probation-related obligations can satisfy custody)
- Dow v. Circuit Court of the First Circuit, 995 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1993) (mandated in-person classes support habeas custody)
- United States v. Ross, 801 F.3d 374 (3d Cir. 2015) (three-part test for custody: severe, immediate, not shared by public)
- Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989) (custody must be pursuant to the judgment challenged)
- Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (Pennsylvania Supreme Court: SORNA registration provisions are punitive when applied retroactively)
- Coppolino v. Noonan, 102 A.3d 1254 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2014) (in-person updating requirements under SORNA are punitive)