Phyllis Bradbury v. City of Eastport
2013 ME 72
| Me. | 2013Background
- The City of Eastport voted in public meetings in Sept. 2011 to sell a 17-acre property (“Boat School”) to First Perry Realty and CPM; closing was planned for Oct. 28, 2011.
- Plaintiffs Bradbury and Gholson sued in Oct. 2011 seeking a declaratory judgment that the sale was invalid for lack of required "advertising," and sought a TRO; TRO denied; City conveyed the property Dec. 1, 2011.
- Plaintiffs recorded a lis pendens in Jan. 2012. Defendants filed counterclaims alleging slander of title and tortious interference based on plaintiffs’ complaint, lis pendens, and extra-judicial statements.
- Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment (May 22, 2012); defendants opposed and submitted evidence of other statements; while summary-judgment motions were pending, plaintiffs filed an anti‑SLAPP special motion to dismiss the counterclaims on Aug. 30, 2012—more than 60 days after service of the counterclaims.
- The Superior Court granted summary judgment to defendants on the declaratory claim and granted plaintiffs summary judgment dismissing the tortious‑interference counterclaim (privileged lis pendens); it denied consideration of the late anti‑SLAPP motion, citing lack of excuse for delay, failure to seek leave, procedural posture (other motions pending), and potential discovery stay. Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court must permit an anti‑SLAPP special motion filed after the 60‑day statutory window absent prejudice or lack of merit | Bradbury: Court should allow late filing unless respondent shows prejudice or the motion is meritless | Defendants: Court has discretion to deny untimely motions; late filing can be denied based on case posture and potential for abuse | Court: Statute gives broad discretion; court need not consider merits or require showing of prejudice when denying late motion |
| Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to consider the untimely anti‑SLAPP motion | Bradbury: Trial court abused discretion because plaintiffs explained delay and asked court to accept the late filing; the motion was timely relative to affidavits | Defendants: Plaintiffs provided no valid reason; motion filed after extensive litigation and discovery; accepting it would improperly stay discovery | Court: No abuse of discretion—findings that plaintiffs offered no valid excuse, failed to seek leave, filed after major motions, and that accepting the motion would stay discovery were reasonable |
Key Cases Cited
- Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader II), 66 A.3d 571 (Me. 2013) (anti‑SLAPP statute purpose and interlocutory appeal rule)
- Nader v. Me. Democratic Party (Nader I), 41 A.3d 551 (Me. 2012) (interpretation principles for anti‑SLAPP statute)
- Morse Bros. v. Webster, 772 A.2d 842 (Me. 2001) (background on SLAPPs and purpose of anti‑SLAPP relief)
- Maietta Constr., Inc. v. Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2004) (statutory purpose to protect citizen speech on development projects)
- Olsen v. Harbison, 35 Cal. Rptr. 3d 909 (Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing potential tactical manipulation of anti‑SLAPP procedures)
