Phuoc Nguyen v. State of Iowa, 2016 Iowa Sup. LEXIS 31

Background

In 1999 Phuoc Thanh Nguyen was convicted of first-degree murder; the jury was instructed on premeditation and felony‑murder with the predicate felony charged as "terrorism" (intimidation with a dangerous weapon).
At the time of trial Iowa precedent (starting with State v. Beeman) allowed an assaultive willful‑injury offense to serve as a predicate felony for felony murder even when the same act caused death.
In 2006 this Court overruled Beeman in State v. Heemstra, adopting the merger doctrine: when the act causing willful injury is the same act that causes death it cannot be the felony predicate for felony murder; Heemstra was expressly given only prospective effect (not retroactive to final convictions).
Nguyen filed a second application for postconviction relief after Heemstra, arguing Heemstra should apply retroactively under the Iowa Constitution (due process, separation of powers, equal protection) and under federal equal protection; he also later argued his postconviction counsel were ineffective for failing to raise common‑law retroactivity.
The district court denied relief; on appeal the Iowa Supreme Court held postconviction counsel were not ineffective and rejected all constitutional challenges to Heemstra’s nonretroactivity, affirming the district court judgment.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Were postconviction counsel ineffective for not urging Heemstra retroactivity on common‑law grounds?	Counsel should have argued for common‑law (Teague/Schriro/Bousley style) retroactivity; failing to do so was deficient.	Heemstra expressly addressed retroactivity and adopted prospective application; raising the claim would be meritless and the remand limited district court to constitutional claims.	Counsel were not ineffective; no duty to pursue a meritless/common‑law retroactivity claim given Heemstra and the limited remand.
Does Iowa due process require retroactive application of Heemstra to final convictions?	Iowa due process should be interpreted more broadly than federal law and require retroactivity.	Federal due process (as applied in Goosman) does not require retroactivity; Iowa should follow that analysis.	Iowa due process does not require retroactivity; Court declines to depart from federal analysis in Goosman.
Does prospective application of Heemstra violate Iowa separation of powers?	Beeman effectively rewrote the legislature’s murder definition; Heemstra revealed judicial usurpation requiring retroactivity.	Changing judicial interpretation (Heemstra) was proper exercise of judicial function—no encroachment on legislative power.	No separation‑of‑powers violation; courts properly interpreted substantive law in both Beeman and Heemstra.
Do equal protection guarantees (Iowa and U.S.) require retroactivity?	Differently situated classes (final convictions vs. later cases) warrant equal protection relief under Iowa Constitution.	States may choose prospectivity; there is a rational basis to treat final and nonfinal cases differently.	No equal protection violation; defendants with final convictions are not similarly situated to those whose cases were decided after Heemstra.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Beeman, 315 N.W.2d 770 (Iowa 1982) (treated willful injury as a proper predicate felony for felony murder)
State v. Heemstra, 721 N.W.2d 549 (Iowa 2006) (adopted merger doctrine; held same‑act willful injury cannot serve as felony‑murder predicate; applied prospectively)
Goosman v. State, 764 N.W.2d 539 (Iowa 2009) (held federal Due Process does not require retroactive application of Heemstra)
Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (U.S. 1989) (federal framework limiting retroactivity of new rules on collateral review)
Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (U.S. 2004) (federal retroactivity principles distinguishing substantive rules and procedural watershed rules)
Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614 (U.S. 1998) (retroactivity analysis for substantive clarifications vs. changes in law)