PHILLIPS v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, 624 F. Supp. 3d 530

April 12, 2018: two Black men were arrested at Starbucks’ 18th & Spruce store after a store manager called police; the incident generated national publicity and protests.
Plaintiff Shannon Phillips, a white Regional Director overseeing Philadelphia (Area 71), was tasked with supporting Starbucks’ post-incident response; the store manager who called police (Hylton) was fired.
In early May 2018 Starbucks suspended District Manager Ben Trinsey (white) after an employee complaint about pay disparity; District Manager Paul Sykes (Black), who oversaw the 18th & Spruce store, was not disciplined despite complaints about his leadership.
On May 7, 2018 Phillips objected to Trinsey’s suspension, saying he was “not a racist”; two days later (May 9) Starbucks terminated Phillips without prior warning.
Phillips sued for reverse race discrimination (Title VII, §1981, NJLAD) and retaliation (Title VII, NJLAD). On summary judgment the court denied Starbucks’ motion as to the discrimination claims but granted it as to the retaliation claims.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Phillips established a prima facie reverse-race discrimination claim under Title VII, §1981, and NJLAD	Phillips says she was terminated because she is white as part of Starbucks’ post-incident efforts; cites disparate treatment of Black DM Sykes (retained) and white DM Trinsey (suspended), public statements, and testimony showing pretext	Starbucks says Phillips was fired for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons — poor leadership and failure to perform as Regional Director after the incident	Court denied summary judgment on discrimination claims; material fact disputes (comparators, credibility, documentation) permit a jury to find discrimination
Whether Phillips engaged in protected activity and thus states a retaliation claim under Title VII and NJLAD	Phillips contends her May 7 objection to Trinsey’s suspension (saying he was not a racist and that the suspension was unfair) was opposing race-based discrimination	Starbucks argues her complaint denied that Trinsey was a "racist" (a state of mind) not that he was being disciplined because he was white; objections to perceived racism aren’t opposition to race-based discrimination	Court granted summary judgment for Starbucks on retaliation claims; holding that objecting to accusations of racism is not protected activity under Title VII/NJLAD and Phillips lacked a reasonable, good-faith belief she was opposing race-based discrimination

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (establishes burden-shifting framework for circumstantial discrimination claims)
Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759 (3d Cir. 1994) (explains employer’s burden and standards for proving pretext at summary judgment)
Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Philadelphia, 198 F.3d 403 (3d Cir. 1999) (pretext inquiry and burdens in Title VII cases)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (summary judgment standard and evaluation of evidence credibility at that stage)
Univ. of Texas Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (retaliation requires but-for causation)
Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151 (3d Cir. 1999) (modified prima facie test for reverse-discrimination claims)
Pivirotto v. Innovative Sys., Inc., 191 F.3d 344 (3d Cir. 1999) (plaintiff need not show replacement by someone outside her class to make out prima facie case)
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358 (3d Cir. 2008) (overlap of prima facie and pretext evidence; evidentiary allocation at summary judgment)
Moore v. City of Philadelphia, 461 F.3d 331 (3d Cir. 2006) (retaliation claims analyzed under McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting)
Lovelace v. Washington Univ. Sch. of Med., 931 F.3d 698 (8th Cir. 2019) (accusation of racist behavior does not itself establish a reasonable, good-faith belief that one is opposing unlawful race discrimination)