Phillips v. Snyder, 836 F.3d 707

Background

Michigan enacted successive statutes (PA 72, PA 4, then PA 436) authorizing state-appointed emergency managers for financially distressed municipalities and school districts; PA 436 is the operative law challenged.
Emergency managers under PA 436 exercise broad authority “for and on behalf of” local governments; PA 436 also provides alternative remedies (consent agreements, neutral evaluation, Chapter 9) and includes an 18‑month removal rule and transition advisory boards (TABs).
Plaintiffs (voters and local elected officials from Detroit, Pontiac, Benton Harbor, Flint, and others) sued, alleging PA 436: (1) violates substantive due process by denying a right to elect local legislative officials; (2) violates the Guarantee Clause; (3) violates Equal Protection (including vote‑right and wealth discrimination) and § 2 of the VRA; (4) violates the First and Thirteenth Amendments.
The district court dismissed nearly all claims (one racial‑discrimination equal‑protection claim survived but was later voluntarily dismissed without prejudice); plaintiffs appealed.
The Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal, holding plaintiffs (except one individual on standing grounds) had Article III standing but their constitutional and statutory claims fail on the merits or are nonjusticiable.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing / Mootness	Plaintiffs allege ongoing, particularized injuries from PA 436’s displacement of local officials and restriction of local democratic control.	Defendants argued lack of standing for some plaintiffs and that claims are moot where control returned (TAB dissolution, school restructurings).	Most plaintiffs had Article III standing; some claims by specific parties may be moot but that did not prevent review of live claims.
Substantive Due Process — Right to elect local legislative officials	Plaintiffs: Due Process protects a fundamental right to elect the individuals exercising local legislative power.	Defendants: States may structure/subdelegate powers among elected and appointed officials; no fundamental right to elective selection of local officers.	No fundamental due‑process right to have local legislative powers exercised by elected officials; rational allocation to appointees is permitted.
Guarantee Clause (Article IV, §4)	Plaintiffs: PA 436 violates the guarantee of a republican form of government at the local level.	Defendants: Guarantee Clause claims are political questions/nonjusticiable and, in any event, do not reach local subdivision structures.	Guarantee Clause claims are nonjusticiable political questions; even if justiciable, precedent supports state authority over political subdivisions.
Equal Protection / VRA §2 / Vote‑right / Wealth discrimination	Plaintiffs: PA 436 burdens the right to vote (practical denial) and discriminates based on wealth/race; §2 covers denial/abridgement of voting rights.	Defendants: Law treats all voters within a jurisdiction equally; classification targets municipal financial status (rational basis); §2 and Presley/Mixon foreclose treating appointive reallocations as VRA vote denials.	PA 436 survives rational‑basis review; it does not abridge equal access to vote within jurisdictions; §2 and precedent (Mixon/Presley) foreclose VRA §2 relief for appointive reallocations.
First Amendment (speech, association, petition)	Plaintiffs: Reallocation of power chills speech, association, and petitioning.	Defendants: PA 436 is neutral re: viewpoint; removal/transfer of governmental power is not a speech restriction; political and statutory remedies remain available.	No First Amendment violation; reallocating governmental power is not viewpoint discrimination or a direct restraint on speech/association.
Thirteenth Amendment	Plaintiffs: PA 436 imposes a “badge or incident of slavery” by disproportionately harming racial minorities and local self‑rule.	Defendants: Law targets financial distress neutrally; disparate impacts do not equate to Thirteenth Amendment badges of slavery.	Thirteenth Amendment claim fails—PA 436 is facially race‑neutral and remote from the evils the Amendment prohibits.

Key Cases Cited

Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (standing requires concrete, particularized, and redressable injury)
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (one person, one vote principle applies in context of state legislative elections)
Sailors v. Board of Education, 387 U.S. 105 (states may experiment with appointive vs. elective selection for local nonlegislative officers)
Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (rejects strict administrative/legislative officer distinction for selection method analysis)
Mixon v. Ohio, 193 F.3d 389 (6th Cir.) (VRA §2 does not reach challenges to appointive selection systems)
Presley v. Etowah County Commission, 502 U.S. 491 (changes that merely redistribute power among officials or delegate to appointees generally do not directly relate to voting for VRA preclearance purposes)
City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100 (disparate neighborhood impact alone does not create a Thirteenth Amendment ‘badge or incident of slavery’)
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (wealth‑based disparities in political classifications do not automatically trigger strict scrutiny)