2:25-cv-01464
D. Nev.Aug 11, 2025Background
- Plaintiff T. Matthew Phillips, a California-licensed attorney appearing pro se, sued Nevada state court Judge Mari Parlade alleging fraud, due-process violations, and improper use of artificial intelligence in rulings.
- Complaint seeks damages and asks this federal court to void/expunge a state-court Minute Order dated August 15, 2023.
- The magistrate judge considered sua sponte dismissal because some claims "cannot possibly win relief."
- Court found that judicial immunity broadly protects judges from civil suits based on their judicial acts, including drafting and issuing rulings.
- The magistrate concluded Rooker–Feldman bars federal review of claims that effectively ask a district court to overturn a state-court judgment.
- Recommendation: dismiss the action with prejudice and without leave to amend. Notice explains 14-day objection period and warns that failure to object may waive appeal.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Judge Parlade is immune from damages claims | Parlade not entitled to judicial immunity because delegating decision-making to AI is not a "judicial act" and therefore outside immunity | Issuing rulings (even if erroneous or using AI) is an inherently judicial act protected by absolute judicial immunity | Judicial immunity bars damages; plaintiff cannot possibly prevail |
| Whether federal court may void/expunge the state-court Minute Order | The requested relief is necessary to remedy alleged errors and constitutional violations in the state case | Federal court lacks jurisdiction to act as an appellate forum for state-court judgments under Rooker–Feldman | Rooker–Feldman bars federal suit that is a de facto appeal; injunctive relief is prohibited |
| Whether alleged AI delegation defeats immunity or jurisdiction doctrines | Use of AI purportedly removes the act from judicial character and/or jurisdictional bounds | Alleged use of AI in issuing rulings remains the judge's judicial function and does not convert the act into nonjudicial conduct | Alleged AI delegation does not avoid immunity or jurisdictional bar |
| Whether dismissal should be with leave to amend | Plaintiff could amend to cure defects | Claims are legally incurable (cannot possibly succeed) | Dismissal recommended with prejudice and without leave to amend |
Key Cases Cited
- Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co., 864 F.2d 635 (9th Cir. 1988) (district courts may dismiss sua sponte when plaintiff cannot possibly win relief)
- Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Ct. for S. Dist. of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (federal courts have authority to dismiss frivolous suits)
- Curry v. Castillo (In re Castillo), 297 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 2002) (scope of absolute judicial immunity for judicial acts)
- Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (articulating Rooker–Feldman doctrine and its application)
- Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136 (9th Cir. 2004) (Rooker–Feldman prohibits federal district court review that is a de facto appeal)
- Kinney v. Cantil-Sakauye, [citation="723 F. App'x 562"] (9th Cir. 2018) (district courts may dismiss claims against judicial officers as barred by judicial immunity or Rooker–Feldman)
- Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991) (failure to timely object to a magistrate judge's report may waive appellate review)
- Huffman v. Lindgren, 81 F.4th 1016 (9th Cir. 2023) (an attorney appearing pro se is not entitled to special leniency)
