Phillips v. Ochoa, 2:22-cv-02086

In December 2020 Judge Vincent Ochoa (Eighth Judicial District, Family Division) terminated Phillips’ parental rights and awarded sole custody to Amber Korpak, relying on Nevada law.
Phillips appealed through Nevada courts; the Nevada Supreme Court affirmed and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari. The federal complaint followed, bringing § 1983 and related claims seeking money damages against the judge, county actors, and Korpak.
Defendants filed three motions to dismiss (judicial immunity, lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and Rooker–Feldman). The Court took judicial notice of the state appellate decisions.
Key legal issues presented: (1) whether Judge Ochoa is entitled to absolute judicial immunity for his decision, and (2) whether Rooker–Feldman bars federal review of claims that attack the state-court judgment (even where damages are sought).
The Court concluded Judge Ochoa’s actions were judicial and within jurisdiction, and that Rooker–Feldman barred Plaintiff’s attempt to relitigate the state-court decision in federal court.
The complaint was dismissed in full with prejudice as amendment would be futile.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Judicial immunity for Judge Ochoa	Ochoa’s acts were ministerial or malicious, so immunity does not apply	Issuing opinions and custody rulings are judicial acts within subject-matter jurisdiction; absolute immunity applies	Judge Ochoa is absolutely immune from § 1983 money damages
Rooker–Feldman Doctrine applicability	Because Phillips seeks only damages, Rooker–Feldman should not bar his federal claims	The federal suit seeks to overturn the state judgment; Rooker–Feldman bars de facto appeals to district court	Rooker–Feldman bars all claims inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment, including damages here
Claims against county/DA/Korpak for enforcing a "void" order	Enforcement of a void order and malicious prosecution supports damages claims	Claims necessarily challenge the validity of the state judgment and are barred; state courts had jurisdiction	Claims against enforcement actors are barred by Rooker–Feldman (and judge is immune where applicable)
Leave to amend	Complaint could be amended to fix defects	Defects are jurisdictional/immunity-based and cannot be cured	Dismissal is with prejudice; amendment would be futile

Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9 (1991) (judicial immunity protects judges from damages for judicial acts)
Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219 (1988) (distinguishing judicial acts from administrative acts; motive does not defeat immunity)
Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349 (1978) (immunity only vitiated by clear absence of all jurisdiction)
Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) (federal district courts lack authority to exercise appellate review of state court judgments)
D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (limits on district court review of state high-court decisions)
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280 (2005) (Rooker–Feldman confined to cases brought by state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (pleading standard for plausible claims)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must be more than formulaic recitation)
Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2003) (explaining when Rooker–Feldman bars federal jurisdiction)
Bianchi v. Rylaarsdam, 334 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2003) (a claim is inextricably intertwined when federal adjudication would undercut the state ruling)
Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1986) (jurisdiction construed broadly to effectuate immunity policies)