Phillips v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co.
293 Neb. 123
| Neb. | 2016Background
- On April 1, 2010, Douglas County deputies executed a warrant to take a minor student into custody at an alternative education center; the student fled back into the building.
- Joan C. Phillips, a staff member who had escorted the student to the back door, was knocked into a wall and to the ground as deputies chased and apprehended the student.
- Phillips sued Douglas County and Sheriff Timothy Dunning under the Political Subdivisions Tort Claims Act (PSTCA), alleging negligence and claiming injuries from the deputies’ conduct.
- The County and Dunning moved for summary judgment; the district court initially granted summary judgment reasoning Phillips’ claim derived from an intentional tort and was barred by PSTCA § 13-910(7).
- After procedural realignments and appeals, the district court entered a nunc pro tunc order granting summary judgment to the County and Dunning on all claims; Phillips appealed to the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether deputies breached a duty of care to an innocent bystander during arrest | Phillips: deputies negligently knocked her into a wall and caused injury while arresting the student | County/Dunning: deputies acted reasonably in effectuating an arrest; privileged to use reasonable force; no breach | Held: No genuine issue of material fact; deputies acted reasonably as a matter of law and summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether PSTCA bars recovery because injury derived from intentional tort (battery) | Phillips: framed claim as negligence (not an intentional tort) against County/Dunning | County/Dunning: argued claim derived from battery against student and thus barred by PSTCA intentional-tort exclusion | Held: Court did not rely on transfer-of-intent theory; resolved case on negligence standard and reasonableness of force instead |
| Standard for liability to innocent bystanders when force is used toward arrestee | Phillips: deputies should be liable if their conduct created risk to bystanders | County/Dunning: privilege to use reasonable force extends to incidental harm to bystanders unless risk was unreasonable | Held: Court applied statutory and common-law framework holding privilege extends to bystander harm unless officer’s actions unreasonably risked such harm; no such risk shown here |
| Whether summary judgment appropriate | Phillips: factual disputes about reasonableness preclude summary judgment | County/Dunning: evidence shows no reasonable factfinder could find breach; entitled to judgment as matter of law | Held: Affirmed summary judgment for defendants — no material factual dispute on breach or reasonableness |
Key Cases Cited
- Zornes v. Zornes, 292 Neb. 271 (2015) (summary judgment standard and appellate review)
- Roskop Dairy v. GEA Farm Tech., 292 Neb. 148 (2015) (prima facie summary judgment burden shifting)
- Connelly v. City of Omaha, 284 Neb. 131 (2012) (PSTCA negligence elements equivalent to ordinary negligence)
- Peterson v. Kings Gate Partners, 290 Neb. 658 (2015) (duty, breach, causation, damages in negligence)
- A.W. v. Lancaster Cty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 280 Neb. 205 (2010) (adopting Restatement (Third) duty analysis; foreseeability as element of negligence, not separate duty)
- State v. Thompson, 244 Neb. 189 (1993) (statutory justification for force in arrests and reasonableness standard)
- Wagner v. City of Omaha, 236 Neb. 843 (1991) (reasonable force in arrests defined by objective standard)
- Waldron v. Roark, 292 Neb. 889 (2016) (reasonableness inquiry for officer force)
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (excessive force analyzed under objective reasonableness standard)
- Hyatt v. Anoka Police Dept., 691 N.W.2d 824 (Minn. 2005) (reasonableness privilege extends to bystander harm unless officer unreasonably risked grave harm)