Phillips v. Community Ins. Corp., 2012 U.S. App. LEXIS 8582

Phillips, pregnant with a municipal arrest, was pursued during a high‑risk stop after reports of a possibly stolen, drunk driver.
Conflicting dispatch information tied the plate to a Honda Civic (silver) vs. Nissan Maxima (black); officers believed the car could be stolen.
Seven squad cars surrounded Phillips's Nissan; officers illuminated the car and ordered Phillips to exit; Phillips did not comply and moved inside the car.
After ten minutes of commands, Hoffman fired a warning SL6 shot, then four additional SL6 shots at Phillips's legs as she remained noncompliant and intoxicated.
Phillips sustained leg injuries requiring medical attention; she later sued for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment.
The district court denied Phillips’s post‑verdict motions; the Seventh Circuit reversed, finding excessive force and no qualified immunity, and remanded for judgment as a matter of law and damages.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Was the use of four SL6 shots excessive force?	Phillips argues excessive force given nonresistance and diminished capacity.	Officers contend force was reasonable to gain compliance in a high‑risk stop.	Yes; force exceeded the Fourth Amendment standard.
Was the car being stolen a controlling factor in force used?	Officers overstated the theft status despite contrary information.	Reasonable belief Phillips drove a stolen car justified the high‑risk approach.	No; objectively reasonable belief dissipated by conflicting information; improvident to rely on it to escalate force.
Were the officers entitled to qualified immunity for the SL6 use?	Right was clearly established against excessive SL6 use on a nonresisting arrestee.	No clearly established law forbidding SL6 use in this precise context; case law allowed discretion in close calls.	No; officers not entitled to qualified immunity; right clearly established by November 11, 2005.
Did the district court err in denying judgment as a matter of law for Phillips?	Record supports reasonable jury determination of excessive force.	Evidence supports reasonable and proportional force under the circumstances.	Yes; judgment as a matter of law for Phillips appropriate.

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (reasonable force balancing intrusion and government interests)
Deorle v. Rutherford, 272 F.3d 1272 (9th Cir. 2001) (impact weapons can cause serious injury; high force not warranted on unarmed arrestee)
Smith v. Ball State Univ. Board of Trustees, 295 F.3d 763 (7th Cir. 2002) (minimal force may be justified to remove an intoxicated driver; passive resistance differs from active resistance)
McAllister v. Price, 615 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2010) (diabetic condition relevant to excessive force analysis; distinguish from Smith on degree of force)
Mercado v. City of Orlando, 407 F.3d 1152 (11th Cir. 2005) (SL6 may be unlawful if used in clearly improper manner despite being 'less lethal')
Estate of Escobedo v. Bender, 600 F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2010) (escalation of force analyzed under totality of circumstances)
Omdahl v. Lindholm, 170 F.3d 730 (7th Cir. 1999) (whether bean-bag rounds constitute deadly force is a jury question)
Padula v. Leimbach, 656 F.3d 595 (7th Cir. 2011) (pepper spray generally limited intrusiveness; force must be proportional to threat)
Hill v. Miller, N.D. Ill. 1995 (unreported) (well established that significant force not reasonably necessary is unlawful)