Phillip v. State
347 P.3d 128
Alaska Ct. App.2015Background
- In June 2012 the Alaska Dept. of Fish and Game issued rolling emergency orders on the Kuskokwim River restricting gear and closing areas to protect a severely depressed king (Chinook) salmon run. Gillnets were limited to small mesh sizes (4" then 6") that are inefficient for kings.
- About 60 people were cited; 13 Yup’ik subsistence fishers were tried for using prohibited gillnets. They waived individualized defenses and argued collectively that their subsistence king-salmon fishing was religiously based and therefore entitled to a free-exercise exemption under the Alaska Constitution.
- Expert testimony established that king salmon occupy a central, spiritually significant role in Yup’ik culture, and defendants’ beliefs and sincerity were accepted by the trial court.
- The State presented scientific, in-season management evidence that the 2012 run was critically low, that rapid management decisions were necessary, and that additional harvests could imperil sustainability.
- The district court found the defendants’ conduct religiously based but held the State met its burden to show a compelling interest would be harmed if a broad religious exemption were recognized; defendants were convicted. The Court of Appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants’ subsistence fishing was religiously based conduct | Fishing for king salmon is central to Yup’ik religious practice and sincerely held | Fishing is a protected religious practice and thus exempt from neutral fishery rules | Court assumed sincerity and religious basis but did not resolve cross-appeal; proceeded to second-step analysis and affirmed denial of exemption |
| What burden the State must meet under Frank v. State to deny an exemption | State must show its emergency orders were the least restrictive means available | Frank requires the State to prove granting the claimed religious exemption would harm its compelling interest (but not strict least-restrictive-means in this context) | Court rejected a strict least-restrictive-means requirement for in-season fishery management and applied Frank’s harm test (State must show its compelling interest would suffer) |
| Whether the State met its burden to show a compelling interest would suffer if exemption granted | Exemption to these defendants would not appreciably harm the run; limited, brief fishing for individuals would be harmless | Granting a broadly available religious exemption would impair the Department’s ability to manage the run and could lead to overharvest and decimation of the species | Held for the State: record evidence supported that a broadly applicable religious exemption would harm the sustainability and the State met its burden |
| Proper scope of the claimed exemption (individualized/limited vs broad collective right) | Relief should be limited to brief, individual exemptions or small numbers | The defense sought a religious exemption applicable to all similarly situated Yup’ik subsistence fishers; evidence supported broad religious practice (e.g., desire for full fish racks) | Court treated the requested exemption as broad and collective and found that scope would threaten the compelling state interest; did not decide narrower exemptions not before it |
Key Cases Cited
- Frank v. State, 604 P.2d 1068 (Alaska 1979) (establishes two-part Alaska free-exercise test and requires State to show harm to compelling interest from granting exemption)
- Larson v. Cooper, 90 P.3d 125 (Alaska 2004) (courts should not impose least-restrictive-means scrutiny that interferes with specialized administrators)
- Native Village of Elim v. State, 990 P.2d 1 (Alaska 1999) (courts lack expertise to second-guess natural resource management decisions)
- Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994) (reaffirming Frank test under Alaska Constitution)
- Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (federal rule that neutral, generally applicable laws do not trigger strict free-exercise review; discussed as contrast to Alaska law)