Phillip M. Tallman v. Bristol Department of Social Services, 0080173

Child born Nov 2014; placed in foster care Feb 4, 2015 after mother overdosed. Father had not lived with mother/child and last saw child Dec 2014.
Child placed with father’s brother and sister-in-law (qualified foster parents) in Nov 2015; father visited regularly Mar–Nov 13, 2015 but missed time during an incarceration.
Department sought a Tennessee home study for father; ICPC raised concerns and home study was not completed. Father completed some recommended services (parenting, psychological, substance-abuse assessments, Project Dads) but not Strengthening Families (one class short) or anger management.
In Nov 2015 father assaulted his mother; she obtained a protective order and JDR court entered a child protective order prohibiting father’s contact with the child and the child’s foster family; judge said visitation could resume if father got help.
Father ceased visiting after Nov 13, 2015 and stopped communicating with the Department. Department petitioned to terminate parental rights Apr 8, 2016; JDR court and then the circuit court terminated father’s parental rights under Va. Code § 16.1-283(C)(1); father appealed.

Issue	Father’s Argument	Department’s Argument	Held
Whether father "failed to maintain continuing contact with and to provide or substantially plan for the future of" the child for six months after placement under Code § 16.1-283(C)(1)	Father took significant steps (completed some programs, obtained license/vehicles, secured housing) and the protective order gave him good cause for lack of contact	Father’s violent conduct produced the protective orders; he stopped all contact and largely ceased cooperating with the Department, so he lacked good cause and did not substantially plan for the child	Court affirmed termination: father failed, without good cause, to maintain contact or substantially plan for the child’s future under § 16.1-283(C)(1)

Logan v. Fairfax Cty. Dep’t of Human Dev., 13 Va. App. 123 (1991) (standard: view evidence in light most favorable to prevailing party)
Martin v. Pittsylvania Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 3 Va. App. 15 (1986) (trial court findings on ore tenus evidence entitled to great weight)
Barkey v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 662 (1986) (good-cause evaluation for termination is fact-specific and child’s best interests guide the inquiry)
Toombs v. Lynchburg Div. of Soc. Servs., 223 Va. 225 (1982) (parent’s actions that lead to discontinued visitation can support termination)
Frye v. Spotte, 4 Va. App. 530 (1987) (past conduct and relationship over a meaningful period predict future parenting)