Philip Walter Jones v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, 906 F.3d 1339

Philip Walter Jones was convicted in Florida state court in June 2006 of aggravated domestic battery and sentenced to 20 years; conviction became final September 18, 2007.
On September 19, 2013 (six years later) Jones filed a Florida Rule 3.850 motion asserting newly discovered evidence: trial counsel failed to convey a 10-year pretrial plea offer he would have accepted.
The Florida trial court denied the Rule 3.850 motion, explaining the alleged evidence could have been discovered earlier (not within the two-year Rule 3.850 limit) and called the motion frivolous; the state appellate court summarily affirmed.
Jones filed a § 2254 habeas petition in federal court on June 27, 2014; respondents moved to dismiss as untimely because the Rule 3.850 motion did not toll AEDPA’s one-year limitations period.
The District Court dismissed the federal petition as time-barred; Jones appealed on the single issue whether the state Rule 3.850 motion was a "properly filed" application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) that tolled AEDPA.
The Eleventh Circuit reviewed de novo, concluded the state court effectively rejected the Rule 3.850 motion as untimely (even if it also called the claim frivolous), and affirmed the dismissal because an untimely state filing is not "properly filed" for tolling under Pace v. DiGuglielmo.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Jones’ Rule 3.850 motion was "properly filed" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) so as to toll AEDPA’s one-year limitations period	Jones: His motion alleged the Rule 3.850 exception (newly discovered evidence) and thus was "properly filed"; state court did not expressly rule the motion untimely	State: The trial court’s order demonstrates the alleged new evidence could have been discovered earlier, so the motion was untimely and not "properly filed"	Court: The state court implicitly ruled the motion untimely; under Pace an untimely state postconviction petition is not "properly filed," so no statutory tolling — affirmed
Whether precedent (Delancy, Drew, Estes) allowing tolling when a movant merely alleges timeliness survives after Pace	Jones: Pre-Pace Eleventh Circuit decisions say an allegation of newly discovered evidence in a Rule 3.850 motion is sufficient to make it "properly filed" for tolling	State: Pace supersedes that line; permitting tolling on mere allegations would permit abusive delay and defeat AEDPA’s purpose	Court: Pace controls; those pre-Pace Eleventh Circuit cases conflict with Pace and are overruled — Pace’s rule applies generally

Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408 (2005) (an untimely state postconviction petition is not "properly filed" for § 2244(d)(2) tolling)
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4 (2000) (defines "properly filed" as compliance with filing rules and distinguishes filing conditions from merits)
Allen v. Siebert, 552 U.S. 3 (2007) (Pace articulates a general rule: time limits are filing conditions regardless of whether they are jurisdictional or affirmative defenses)
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214 (2002) (discusses tolling and finality under AEDPA)
Evans v. Chavis, 546 U.S. 189 (2006) (federal courts may decide timeliness when state court does not clearly rule on it)
Gorby v. McNeil, 530 F.3d 1363 (11th Cir. 2008) (federal court may independently assess state-law timeliness when state court’s ruling is ambiguous)
Delancy v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 246 F.3d 1328 (11th Cir. 2001) (pre-Pace: held allegations in Rule 3.850 could render motion "properly filed")
Drew v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2002) (same line as Delancy)
Estes v. Chapman, 382 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2004) (relied on Delancy/Drew; overruled to extent inconsistent with Pace)
Sweet v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 467 F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2006) (state court’s unambiguous timeliness ruling compels finding no tolling)
Walton v. Secretary, Florida Dep’t of Corr., 661 F.3d 1308 (11th Cir. 2011) (applies Evans and Gorby to reject tolling where state filing was untimely)