Philip Vitale v. Schering-Plough Corporation
146 A.3d 162
| N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. | 2016Background
- Philip Vitale, an Allied Barton security guard assigned to Schering‑Plough sites, signed an employment "Worker's Comp Disclaimer" waiving rights to sue Allied Barton's customers for work injuries covered by the Workers' Compensation Act (WCA).
- Vitale fell down a dark stairwell at Schering‑Plough's facility in 2009, suffered serious injuries, and received workers' compensation benefits from Allied Barton.
- Vitale sued Schering‑Plough for negligence; a jury found Schering‑Plough negligent and awarded $900,000 plus interest and fees.
- Schering‑Plough moved for summary judgment arguing the disclaimer barred Vitale's third‑party negligence suit; Allied Barton filed amicus supporting enforceability.
- The trial court denied summary judgment; the Appellate Division affirmed that the disclaimer is unenforceable as contrary to public policy and the WCA, but reversed on the comparative‑negligence issue and remanded for a new liability trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Enforceability of employer's waiver of employee's right to sue third‑party clients for workplace negligence | Vitale: the waiver violates public policy and the WCA; it unlawfully bars claims against third parties and may waive claims for reckless/intentional conduct | Schering‑Plough/Allied Barton: the disclaimer is a valid exculpatory clause that merely limits remedies to workers' compensation (consistent with other jurisdictions) | Waiver unenforceable: it conflicts with New Jersey public policy and the WCA, may improperly waive claims for reckless/intentional conduct, and reduces the special employer's incentive to keep premises safe |
| Scope of WCA "intentional wrong" exception and whether disclaimer can waive reckless/intentional claims | Vitale: WCA protects against contractual elimination of claims that should fall outside exclusive remedy only narrowly under "intentional wrong" | Schering‑Plough: disclaimer limited to WCA‑covered claims and thus did not waive intentional/reckless conduct claims | Court: the intentional‑wrong exception is narrow; disclaimer cannot broadly waive reckless or intentional claims and may unlawfully waive claims that should be outside WCA exclusivity |
| Comparative negligence defense — whether trial court should have charged jury | Vitale: court erred in denying charge because no sufficient evidence of Vitale's negligence | Schering‑Plough: presented evidence (light off, Vitale's presence in dark) to support comparative negligence | Reversed: charge should have been given; evidence (though slim) permitted reasonable inference of Vitale's contributory negligence, so remand for new trial on liability only |
| Admissibility of lay witness opinion (coworker on cause of fall) | Vitale: coworker’s testimony was permissible lay opinion based on perception and report | Schering‑Plough: testimony amounted to improper lay opinion/speculation on causation | Affirmed: coworker’s testimony was admissible under N.J.R.E. 701 as rationally based observations and reasonable inferences; no abuse of discretion |
Key Cases Cited
- Rodriguez v. Raymours Furniture Co., 225 N.J. 343 (2016) (adhesion‑contract analysis and limits on contractual curtailment of statutorily protected rights)
- Stelluti v. Casapenn Enters., LLC, 203 N.J. 286 (2010) (enforceability of exculpatory agreements depends on activity risk and public policy; cannot waive reckless/intentional conduct)
- Hojnowski v. Vans Skate Park, 187 N.J. 323 (2006) (exculpatory clauses disfavored and scrutinized because they can encourage lack of care)
- Marcinczyk v. State Police Training Comm'n, 203 N.J. 586 (2010) (requirements for clear, unambiguous waiver of legal rights)
- Van Dunk v. Reckson Assocs. Realty Corp., 210 N.J. 449 (2012) (narrow construction of WCA "intentional wrong" exception requiring substantial certainty of injury)
- Estate of Kotsovska ex rel. Kotsovska v. Liebman, 221 N.J. 568 (2015) (WCA purposes and liberal construction as remedial social legislation)