725 F.3d 795
7th Cir.2013Background
- Crosby, a Cooper B-Line employee, suffered a workplace finger amputation, filed a workers’ compensation claim, and returned to work.
- Cooper suspended and later pressured Crosby to accept a ‘‘grievance settlement’’ labeled a “voluntary separation” described as a “permanent layoff without recall rights”; union rep filed and then withdrew a grievance per the settlement.
- Crosby later sued in Illinois state court for retaliatory discharge under the Illinois Workers’ Compensation Act, alleging Cooper fired him in retaliation for filing the workers’ comp claim.
- Cooper removed to federal court asserting Section 301 of the LMRA (29 U.S.C. § 185) completely preempted the state claim because the settlement/CBA controls, and sought dismissal for failure to exhaust contractual remedies.
- The district court granted summary judgment for Cooper; on appeal Crosby argued the federal court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction because his claim was a state-law retaliatory-discharge claim not completely preempted by Section 301.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Section 301 completely preempts Crosby’s Illinois retaliatory-discharge claim | Crosby: Claim is state-law, purely factual (motive, discharge) and does not require interpreting the CBA or settlement | Cooper: Settlement labels the separation voluntary; proving discharge requires attacking/interpretation of the settlement and CBA → §301 governs | Held: No complete preemption; resolution does not require interpretation of the CBA or settlement; federal jurisdiction absent → remand to state court |
| Whether removal was proper | Crosby: Removal improper because no federal question on face of complaint | Cooper: Removal proper because claim is disguised §301 action | Held: Removal improper; district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under §1331 |
| Whether Crosby must exhaust CBA remedies before suing | Crosby: Not addressed at trial; argues state claim proceeds in state court | Cooper: Even if not preempted, plaintiff must have exhausted contractual remedies (alternative ground to dismiss) | Held: Court did not reach exhaustion argument; unnecessary after resolving preemption issue |
| Effect of grievance settlement label on discharge element | Crosby: Label does not control; Illinois law looks to circumstances to determine discharge | Cooper: Settlement’s ‘‘voluntary separation’’ designation precludes discharge finding without interpreting the agreement | Held: Settlement label not dispositive under Illinois law (Hinthorn); facts determine discharge, so no §301 interpretation required |
Key Cases Cited
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state retaliatory-discharge claims generally not completely preempted by §301 because they are factual and do not require interpreting CBAs)
- Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987) (complete-preemption doctrine and limits on defendants transforming state claims into federal ones)
- Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (§301 preemption applies when state-law claim is inextricably intertwined with CBA interpretation)
- Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983) (example of statute whose preemptive force converts state claims into federal ones)
- Hinthorn v. Roland’s of Bloomington, Inc., 122 Ill.2d 72 (1988) (Ill. S. Ct.) (employer’s label of a resignation does not control whether an employee was discharged; courts examine surrounding circumstances)