Philadelphia DA's Office v. G. Stover
1952 C.D. 2016
| Pa. Commw. Ct. | Sep 12, 2017Background
- Gregory Stover, an incarcerated individual, requested three documents from the Philadelphia District Attorney’s Office under the RTKL: Order of Conviction (11/6/1987), Order of Sentence (11/21/1988), and DC-300B Court Commitment Form (11/21/1988).
- The District Attorney denied the request, asserting the materials are nonfinancial "judicial records" and thus exempt from disclosure under the RTKL.
- Stover appealed to the Office of Open Records (OOR); the OOR concluded it had jurisdiction over the appeal (because the request was directed to a local agency) and ordered disclosure without deciding whether the records were judicial records.
- The District Attorney appealed to the Court of Common Pleas, which affirmed the OOR’s order; the DA then appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
- The Commonwealth Court agreed the OOR had jurisdiction to hear the appeal but held the requested documents are records "of" a judicial agency (court of common pleas) and therefore exempt from disclosure under the RTKL.
- The court limited its holding to court orders; it did not decide the status of documents created by a district attorney and filed in court, and noted other remedies exist for defendants seeking court orders.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Stover) | Defendant's Argument (Philadelphia DA) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did the OOR have jurisdiction to hear the appeal? | Stover appealed to OOR from DA denial; OOR is proper forum for local-agency denials. | DA argued records were nonfinancial judicial-agency records and OOR lacked jurisdiction to hear appeals implicating judicial records. | OOR had jurisdiction because the request was directed to the DA (a local agency). |
| Are the requested documents "records of a judicial agency" (exempt from RTKL except financial records)? | Stover contended the records were public and the DA possessed them, so they should be disclosed. | DA argued the Order of Conviction, Order of Sentence, and Commitment Form originate from the court and thus are judicial records exempt from disclosure. | Held they are records of a judicial agency (court orders and commitment form) and exempt from RTKL disclosure. |
| Does DA possession or ability to obtain copies convert judicial records into local-agency records? | Stover implied possession = accessibility through RTKL. | DA argued possession does not change the character; subject matter controls. | Court held possession alone does not change character; subject matter controls and these are judicial records. |
| Are there alternative means for defendants to obtain these court orders? | Stover sought relief under RTKL. | DA and amici noted RTKL is not sole mechanism; criminal and civil rules/procedures provide access. | Court noted other avenues (e.g., Pa.R.Crim.P. 113, mandamus/equitable relief) exist and RTKL cannot be rewritten to grant access to judicial records. |
Key Cases Cited
- Grine v. County of Centre, 138 A.3d 88 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (character-of-record test; records must "document a transaction or activity" of the agency to be "of" that agency)
- Faulk v. Philadelphia Clerk of Courts, 116 A.3d 1183 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2015) (only financial records of judicial agencies are accessible under the RTKL)
- Miller v. County of Centre, 135 A.3d 233 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016) (district attorney’s office is a local agency for RTKL purposes)
- Pettit v. Namie, 931 A.2d 790 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2007) (district attorney functionally part of county/local government)
- Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County v. Office of Open Records, 2 A.3d 810 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010) (rejecting result that would make section 304 meaningless; judicial records remain exempt)