Phi, Inc. v. Texas Juvenile Justice Department F/K/A Texas Youth Commission, 593 S.W.3d 296

PHI, Inc. owned a medical helicopter that was damaged when an unoccupied Texas Juvenile Justice Department (Department) 15‑passenger van rolled down an incline and struck the grounded helicopter. No one was injured.
Department employee Christopher Webb parked the van, turned off the ignition, removed the key, exited the vehicle, and (according to some reports) did not set the emergency/parking brake. A police investigator listed "Parked and Failed to Set Brakes" as a contributing factor.
Post‑accident inspection revealed worn shifter bushings/shift lever that may have prevented the van from fully engaging park; no record evidence showed Webb knew of that defect. Another employee earlier reported the van was "running rough."
PHI sued the Department for negligence, alleging (1) failure to engage the emergency brake/secure the vehicle and (2) negligent maintenance of the van. The Department asserted sovereign immunity under the Texas Tort Claims Act.
The trial court denied the Department’s combined plea to the jurisdiction and summary‑judgment motion; the court of appeals reversed, holding the motor‑vehicle exception did not apply because the van was not in "active" operation when it rolled and because negligent maintenance is not "operation or use." The Supreme Court of Texas granted review.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether PHI’s claim that the driver failed to set the emergency/parking brake "arises from the operation or use" of a motor vehicle, waiving sovereign immunity under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §101.021(1)(A)	Failure to secure the van on an incline is part of operating/using the vehicle; the accident arose from that negligent act, creating a fact issue for trial	Rider precedent requires "active" operation at the moment of the incident; Webb had exited the vehicle, so the motor‑vehicle exception does not apply	Court held that securing a vehicle (including use of the parking/emergency brake) is part of operation/use; close temporal connection here creates a fact issue as to whether the damage "arose from" vehicle use, so immunity is not resolved as a matter of law
Whether negligent maintenance claims (defective shifter) constitute "operation or use" under the motor‑vehicle exception	Maintenance defects may be alternative grounds to show the accident arose from vehicle use	Maintenance is not "operation or use" and thus does not waive immunity	Court declined to reach this issue (PHI sought reversal on the parking‑brake theory and court resolved the case on that ground)

LeLeaux v. Hampshire–Fannett Indep. Sch. Dist., 835 S.W.2d 49 (Tex. 1992) (injury on a parked, empty bus was the setting for harm, not arising from vehicle operation)
Ryder Integrated Logistics, Inc. v. Fayette Cty., 453 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2015) (motor‑vehicle exception applies where vehicle was in use; discussed "active operation" concept)
Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. White, 46 S.W.3d 864 (Tex. 2001) (statutory "arises from" requires that use/operation actually caused the injury)
Travis Cent. Appraisal Dist. v. Norman, 342 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. 2011) (sovereign immunity protects the State and its agencies)
Mount Pleasant Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Estate of Lindburg, 766 S.W.2d 208 (Tex. 1989) (definitions of "use" and "operation" in vehicle context)
Prairie View A & M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. 2012) (waivers of sovereign immunity must be strictly construed)