532 S.W.3d 437
Tex. App.2017Background
- John Robert Phelps was convicted by a jury of prohibited sexual conduct (incest) for engaging in sexual intercourse with his 19‑year‑old daughter, Ashley; sentence: 20 years, $10,000 fine; court‑appointed attorney fees ($400) were also assessed.
- Ashley testified to long‑term sexual, physical, and mental abuse beginning in childhood and continuing into adulthood, described an incident in 2012 where Phelps awakened her and penetrated her despite her attempts to push him away.
- Other witnesses corroborated aspects of abuse and Ashley’s fear; Ashley reported the abuse to police and a friend after leaving the household.
- Phelps denied the acts; his wife recanted earlier indications and said she never saw sexual abuse; defense argued Ashley was an accomplice and her uncorroborated testimony was legally insufficient.
- Trial court instructed jury on accomplice‑witness rule; jury convicted. On appeal Phelps argued (1) Ashley was an accomplice as a matter of law so her testimony required corroboration, and (2) the trial court erred by not instructing the jury that Ashley was an accomplice as a matter of law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether complaining witness (Ashley) was an accomplice as a matter of law | State: Ashley was a victim; no corroboration required | Phelps: Ashley was a willing participant/accomplice, so her testimony required corroboration | Court: Ashley was not an accomplice as a matter of law; prosecution need not corroborate her testimony |
| Whether failure to instruct jury that Ashley was an accomplice was error | State: no instruction necessary because she was not an accomplice | Phelps: trial court should have instructed jury that she was an accomplice as a matter of law | Court: No error—no duty to instruct that a witness is an accomplice unless it is indisputable she is one |
| Whether statutory change to incest statute affects accomplice presumption | State: 1973 Penal Code language removed the prior presumption that both parties are co‑perpetrators | Phelps: older cases (Bolin/Mercer) controlling; complaining witness presumed accomplice absent proof of force/threat | Court: 1973 amendment superseded the Bolin/Mercer presumption; defendant must produce affirmative evidence that witness willingly participated |
| Whether attorney’s fees assessment was proper | State: fees were assessed by trial court | Phelps: indigent; trial court made no finding he could pay | Court: Modify judgment to delete court‑appointed attorney fees because no finding of ability to pay |
Key Cases Cited
- Bolin v. State, 505 S.W.2d 912 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (earlier rule treating consenting incestuous participant as accomplice; court discusses limits after statutory amendment)
- Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (a witness is an accomplice only if their participation included affirmative acts promoting the offense)
- Brown v. State, 657 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (threats/force can support jury finding that complaining witness was compelled and not an accomplice)
- Zamora v. State, 411 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (definition of accomplice: one who could be charged with the same or a lesser‑included offense)
