Pharrell Williams v. Frankie Gaye
885 F.3d 1150
| 9th Cir. | 2018Background
- Marvin Gaye’s 1977 composition “Got to Give It Up” was registered under the 1909 Copyright Act; the deposit copy was a handwritten lead sheet prepared by a transcriber. The Gayes (heirs) sued over Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke, and T.I.’s 2013 hit “Blurred Lines.”
- Plaintiffs (Gayes) alleged that “Blurred Lines” infringed the Gaye composition; defendants (Thicke Parties and record companies) disputed substantial similarity and scope of the 1909 Act deposit copy.
- The district court excluded the commercial recording of Gaye’s song from the jury and limited the copyrighted work to the deposit copy; experts for both sides disagreed about what the deposit copy contained.
- After a 7‑day trial a jury found infringement by Williams and Thicke (not T.I. or certain distributors), awarding damages and profits; the district court later altered some awards, entered judgment against additional parties, and imposed a 50% running royalty.
- On appeal the Ninth Circuit affirmed most rulings (including liability as to Williams and Thicke, damages/profits, and the running royalty), reversed the district court’s post‑verdict judgment against T.I. and the distributors (finding waiver/insufficient basis), declined to review summary‑judgment denial after trial, and affirmed denial of attorneys’ fees and the costs allocation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Standard/range of protection for musical compositions | Gayes: music merits broad protection; substantial similarity can be met without virtual identity. | Thicke: musical copyrights are thin and require virtual identity to infringe. | Court: musical compositions are not confined to a narrow range; broad protection applies—plaintiffs need not prove virtual identity. |
| Scope of 1909 Act copyright evidence | Gayes: commercial sound recording may inform scope; deposit copy is not the sole measure (preserved only if new trial). | Thicke: scope limited to the four corners of the deposit copy. | Court: accepted district court’s limitation (deposit copy) for this appeal without deciding the broader issue. |
| Reviewability of denial of summary judgment after trial | Thicke: district court erred in applying extrinsic test at summary judgment; appealable. | Gayes: summary‑judgment denial is not reviewable after a full trial. | Court: Ortiz controls—denial of summary judgment is not reviewable after a full trial; exception not applicable here. |
| Post‑trial alteration of jury verdicts (distribution/vicarious liability) | Gayes: district court properly entered judgment against T.I. and distributors. | Thicke/Interscope/Harris: district court lacked authority; Gayes waived inconsistency challenge and failed to move under Rule 50(a). | Court: reversed district court’s judgment against T.I. and the distributors—Gayes waived objection and failed to meet Rule 50 procedural requirements; no vicarious liability shown for T.I. |
Key Cases Cited
- Swirsky v. Carey, 376 F.3d 841 (9th Cir. 2004) (two‑part extrinsic/intrinsic test; analytical dissection and expert testimony required)
- Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3d 477 (9th Cir. 2000) (access plus substantial similarity; combinations of unprotectable elements can be protected)
- Ortiz v. Jordan, 562 U.S. 180 (2011) (order denying summary judgment is not appealable after full trial on the merits)
- Benay v. Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc., 607 F.3d 620 (9th Cir. 2010) (intrinsic test reserved to trier of fact; extrinsic at summary judgment)
- Newton v. Diamond, 388 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (sampling/de minimis and treatment of sound recording elements)
- Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010) (broad vs. thin copyright protection and range of expression)
- Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007) (standards for secondary liability; right/ability to supervise and direct financial interest)