Pharaoh Oil & Gas, Inc. v. Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd.
343 S.W.3d 875
| Tex. App. | 2011Background
- Ranchero Esperanza, Ltd. owns the surface and one-half of the mineral estate on a Crockett County ranch; Pharaoh Oil & Gas, Inc. operates wells on the Ranch since 2004–2006.
- Ranchero sued in 2008 alleging Pharaoh stored equipment on Top Yard (Section 18) and Bottom Yard (Section 2), causing vegetation loss, potential soil erosion, and environmental leakage.
- Texas Railroad Commission ordered Pharaoh to plug, sever, and seal all open wells in Section 18 on April 28, 2009; Ranchero introduced testimony and photographs of storage and leakage on both yards.
- Environmental engineer Deborah Moore testified about surface staining and leakage; Ranchero estimated cleanup costs of $100,000 or more.
- Donny McClure testified Ranchero had not authorized storage on the Bottom Yard or Top Yard; Pharaoh’s chief executive Bolen admitted storage history and potential reuse but denied needing Ranchero’s permission for Bottom Yard parking.
- Trial court granted a temporary injunction prohibiting storage of unused equipment; Pharaoh appeals urging the injunction is a preservation of status quo rather than a true injunction and may be mandatory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the injunction is a mandatory injunction altering the status quo. | Pharaoh argues the order goes beyond preservation of the status quo. | Ranchero contends the order restores the prior surface use. | Yes; the injunction is mandatory and alters the status quo. |
| Whether the injunction demonstrates irreparable harm or extreme hardship justifying a mandatory remedy. | Ranchero claims irreparable environmental injury and ongoing harm. | Pharaoh contends any alleged harms are compensable and not irreparable. | No clear irreparable harm or extreme hardship proven; insufficient for a mandatory injunction. |
| Whether the trial court properly balanced the merits of storage use against the property rights. | Ranchero asserts exclusive surface right to exclude storage not reasonably necessary. | Pharaoh contends use is reasonably necessary for production and related operations. | The merits should be resolved on trial, not in a temporary injunction; the injunction was abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. 2002) (irreparable injury central to injunction analysis)
- Tri-Star Petroleum Co. v. Tipperary Corp., 101 S.W.3d 583 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003) (injunction standards; not final merits review)
- RP & R, Inc. v. Territo, 32 S.W.3d 396 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000) (distinguishes prohibitive vs. mandatory injunctions; status quo concept)
- In re Newton, 146 S.W.3d 648 (Tex.2004) (status quo definition; trial on merits for legality of acts)
- Rhodia, Inc. v. Harris County, 470 S.W.2d 415 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971) (mandatory injunction appropriate only for extreme necessity or hardship)