Peulic v. Garland, 22 F.4th 340

Igor Peulic, a Bosnian native admitted to the U.S. as a refugee in 1992, was convicted in Massachusetts (2016) of assault with a dangerous weapon (ADW) and related firearm offenses arising from a February 2015 incident in which he fired shots, pointed a gun at a police officer, fled, and was shot by that officer.
DHS charged Peulic as removable for an aggravated felony (a crime of violence) and for firearms offenses; the immigration judge (IJ) sustained removability.
Peulic applied for adjustment of status under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(a) and a concurrent waiver of inadmissibility under § 1159(c), plus asylum/withholding/CAT; USCIS denied adjustment and waiver invoking the heightened hardship standard articulated in Matter of Jean.
The IJ and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) found Peulic's ADW a violent/dangerous crime, applied the Matter of Jean heightened standard (requiring ‘‘exceptional and extremely unusual hardship’’), concluded Peulic failed to meet it, alternatively denied relief in the exercise of discretion, and ordered removal.
On review, Peulic argued the Jean standard exceeded the Attorney General’s statutory authority, was unconstitutionally vague, and was misapplied by the IJ/BIA; the First Circuit held it had jurisdiction to decide the legal questions, declined to reweigh hardship, and denied/dismissed the petition in part.

Issue	Peulic's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Validity of Matter of Jean’s heightened waiver standard under § 1159(c)	Jean exceeded AG authority by imposing an extra hardship requirement not found in the statute	AG has broad discretion to set standards for exercising §1159(c) discretion; Jean is a permissible construction	Jean is a lawful, nonarbitrary exercise of AG discretion; upheld
Vagueness of “violent or dangerous” (Due Process)	Term is unbounded and void-for-vagueness, denying fair notice	Jean applies the term to real-world facts; not hopelessly indeterminate	Term is not unconstitutionally vague when applied to case-specific facts; upheld
Whether the IJ/BIA misapplied Jean or failed to consider hardship evidence	IJ/BIA ignored or misweighed voluminous hardship evidence and rubber-stamped USCIS denial	Courts lack jurisdiction to reweigh discretionary determinations; BIA and IJ did consider record and weighed factors	Review limited to legal errors and substantial-evidence review; substantial evidence supports IJ/BIA findings; no reversible error
Whether IJ/BIA failed to consider other "extraordinary circumstances" besides hardship	Jean does not limit extraordinary circumstances to hardship; agency should consider other extraordinary equities	IJ considered trauma, country conditions, rehabilitation and found they did not outweigh the crime’s seriousness	BIA/IJ adequately considered other extraordinary factors and permissibly denied relief in discretion

INS v. Yang, 519 U.S. 26 (1996) (recognizing broad discretionary authority to grant waivers and likening it to acts of grace)
Mejia v. Gonzales, 499 F.3d 991 (9th Cir. 2007) (upheld AG’s heightened hardship standard as permissible construction in similar waiver context)
Ali v. Achim, 468 F.3d 462 (7th Cir. 2006) (held Matter of Jean within AG’s statutory authority)
Torres-Valdivias v. Lynch, 786 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 2015) (AG may establish standards for discretionary relief)
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018) (void-for-vagueness framework for "crime of violence" definitions)
Perez-Trujillo v. Garland, 3 F.4th 10 (1st Cir. 2021) (courts cannot reweigh hardship evidence; distinguishes cases where BIA ignored special risks)
Pojoy-De León v. Barr, 984 F.3d 11 (1st Cir. 2020) (standards of review: legal questions de novo; factual findings under substantial evidence)
Thapaliya v. Holder, 750 F.3d 56 (1st Cir. 2014) (substantial evidence standard for administrative findings)
Ayeni v. Holder, 617 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2010) (court has jurisdiction to review claims that BIA applied an incorrect legal standard)