Pettit v. Steppingstone, Center for the Potentially Gifted, 429 F. App'x 524

Pettit sued her former employer Steppingstone and headmistress Morse, alleging FLSA retaliation after adverse actions were taken following her wage-and-hour complaints.
Pettit served as Director of Admissions and Director of Human Resources and worked under year-long form-letter agreements; she never received a written contract in 2007 and was not given a new contract for 2008 without negotiations.
Pettit raised FLSA concerns in December 2007, advised outside counsel, and communicated with Morse and the Board about misclassification and a wage-and-hour policy.
Morse redirected Pettit to focus on admissions due to campus relocation, limiting Pettit’s HR duties and directing time and attention away from the FLSA issue.
Pettit’s February 1, 2008 email to the Executive Committee asserted FLSA noncompliance and threatened reporting to the DOL; subsequent emails continued the dispute.
Morse presented Pettit with several revised contracts in early 2008 containing adverse provisions (shift of HR duties, 20-hour weekly limit, termination/arbitration/confidentiality terms), which Pettit did not sign; Pettit was escorted off the premises after refusing to sign.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Pettit proved a prima facie retaliation case under the FLSA.	Pettit contends protected activity occurred and caused adverse actions.	Defendants argue actions were legitimate responses to business needs and Pettit’s conduct.	Pettit established a prima facie case, but failed to show pretext; summary judgment affirmed.
Whether the adverse actions were sufficiently material to be actionable.	Actions like contract changes and HR-duties removal were materially adverse.	Actions were not materially adverse or were justified by business needs.	Two actions were materially adverse; other actions did not meet material adversity standard.
Whether Pettit’s evidence supports pretext for retaliation.	Temporal proximity and disparate treatment show pretext.	Legitimate business reasons negate pretext; Pettit failed to rebut them.	No genuine issue of material fact on pretext; reasons were not shown to be pretext.
Whether the district court erred in applying McDonnell Douglas framework.	Direct evidence removes burden-shifting.	Framework applicable; evidence not direct enough.	McDonnell Douglas framework preserved; Pettit failed to supply direct evidence.

McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (burden-shifting framework for retaliation claims)
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981) (establishes burden of production and inference for pretext)
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133 (2000) (proof of pretext on ultimate question)
Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006) (causal standard: materially adverse action)
Adair v. Charter Cnty. of Wayne, 452 F.3d 483 (6th Cir. 2006) (four-part prima facie framework for retaliation)
Spengler v. Worthington Cylinders, 615 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2010) (direct vs. indirect evidence of retaliation; proximity plus other evidence)
Cantrell v. Nissan N. Am. Inc., 145 F. App’x 99 (6th Cir. 2005) (temporal proximity with other evidence can prove causation)
Bowman v. Shawnee State Univ., 220 F.3d 456 (6th Cir. 2000) (adverse actions in retaliation and demotion concepts)
Moore v. Freeman, 355 F.3d 558 (6th Cir. 2004) (corrective action and causation handling in retaliation)
Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630 (6th Cir. 1987) (constructive discharge concepts in retaliation)