198 Conn.App. 838
Conn. App. Ct.2020Background
- The City of Meriden adopted a motor vehicle ordinance under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 14-150a prohibiting abandoned, inoperable, or unregistered vehicles and prescribing notice and a hearing procedure before a city hearing officer.
- The hearing officer found Petrucelli in violation and ordered removal of the vehicles within five days (not a money judgment).
- Petrucelli filed a "petition to reopen assessment" in Superior Court, invoking Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7-152b(g) and Practice Book § 23-51, and sought a de novo hearing.
- The Superior Court held a de novo hearing, entered judgment for the city, and directed the city to enforce the order. Petrucelli appealed.
- The appellate court held the threshold question was subject matter jurisdiction: whether the petitioner had a statutory right to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to Superior Court.
- The court concluded no statutory avenue existed: § 14-150a and the ordinance do not authorize a Superior Court appeal; § 7-152b applies only to specified statutes and to monetary "assessments" (which this order was not); Practice Book § 23-51 sets procedure but does not create a right to appeal. The trial court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction; judgment reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Petrucelli's Argument | Meriden's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Petrucelli had a statutory right to appeal the hearing officer’s decision to Superior Court | § 7-152b(g) and Practice Book § 23-51 permitted filing a petition to reopen the assessment and de novo review | No statute authorizes appeal from a § 14-150a ordinance hearing officer; § 7-152b and Practice Book § 23-51 do not apply here | No statutory right to appeal; Superior Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction |
| Whether the hearing officer’s decision was an "assessment" under § 7-152b | The decision was labeled an "assessment" and thus appealable under § 7-152b(g) | § 7-152b applies only to ordinances under specified statutes and to monetary assessments; the hearing ordered removal, not a money judgment | Not an assessment under § 7-152b; § 7-152b(g) did not authorize the appeal |
| Whether Practice Book § 23-51 conferred an independent right to appeal | Practice Book § 23-51 authorizes petitions to reopen and thus supports appellate jurisdiction | Practice Book § 23-51 prescribes procedure for petitions to reopen but does not create a statutory right of appeal | Practice Book § 23-51 does not confer jurisdiction absent statutory authority |
| Remedy when no statutory right of appeal exists | Permit merits adjudication and enforcement of hearing officer decision | Dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction | Trial court should have dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; judgment reversed and remanded with direction to dismiss |
Key Cases Cited
- Gianetti v. Dunsby, 182 Conn. App. 855 (Conn. App. 2018) (no subject matter jurisdiction for administrative appeals absent statutory authorization)
- Tazza v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 164 Conn. 187 (Conn. 1972) (no absolute right of appeal from administrative bodies; appeals exist only by statute)
- In re Probate Appeal of Knott, 190 Conn. App. 56 (Conn. App. 2019) (jurisdictional rulings are questions of law reviewed plenarily)
- Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 449 (Conn. 1965) (the right to appeal is a statutory privilege, not a constitutional right)
- Fagan v. Stamford, 179 Conn. App. 440 (Conn. App. 2018) (Superior Court acts as an appellate body in administrative appeals)
- Maresca v. Ridgefield, 35 Conn. App. 769 (Conn. App. 1994) (UAPA provides framework for appeals only from state agencies)
- Chase Home Finance, LLC v. Scroggin, 194 Conn. App. 843 (Conn. App. 2019) (principles of statutory construction and reliance on text and related statutes)
- Compass Bank v. Dunn, 196 Conn. App. 43 (Conn. App. 2020) (rules of practice are construed under the same principles as statutes)