Petro-Hunt, L.L.C. v. United States
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 12703
| Fed. Cir. | 2017Background
- Petro-Hunt owns (as successor) 96 mineral servitudes covering ~180,000 acres of Kisatchie National Forest; Louisiana law allowed a 10-year prescription (reversion) for unused servitudes.
- Act 315 (La. 1940) made certain mineral rights imprescriptible as to lands sold to the United States; Nebo Oil (5th Cir.) interpreted Act 315 to protect an 800-acre servitude.
- The U.S. acquired Kisatchie lands in the 1930s; the Government later (beginning c.1991) issued many 10‑year mineral leases over the servitudes.
- Petro-Hunt sued in district court (Quiet Title Action) in 2000 to quiet title/alternatively seek compensation; simultaneously it filed takings claims in the Court of Federal Claims (CFC).
- CFC dismissed Petro‑Hunt’s permanent takings and contract claims as time‑barred, dismissed many temporary takings claims as time‑barred, later held remaining temporary takings claims barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1500, and dismissed the judicial‑takings claim for lack of jurisdiction to review a federal court decision.
- On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed dismissal in full: statute of limitations bars permanent/contract claims; accrual at lease start bars many temporary claims; § 1500 bars the rest; CFC lacks jurisdiction to relitigate the Fifth Circuit’s ruling on property rights.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Statute of limitations for permanent takings and contract claims (28 U.S.C. § 2501) | Accrual was suspended by Act 315/Nebo Oil; claims didn’t accrue until Quiet Title Action resolved. | Accrual suspension ended by 1993 when predecessors learned Government claimed servitudes and leased them; suit filed in 2000 is too late. | Claims accrued no later than 1993; permanent takings and contract claims are time‑barred. |
| Accrual date for temporary physical takings (leases) | Temporary takings accrue at lease termination because damage/economic harm measurable only after lease ends (analogy to regulatory takings). | Temporary physical takings accrue when government enters physical possession / at lease start; just compensation can be measured then. | Accrual occurs at lease commencement; leases older than six years before filing are time‑barred. |
| Jurisdictional bar of 28 U.S.C. § 1500 for remaining temporary takings claims | The district court filing merely stated background facts; the alternative compensation request there was not a pending claim for § 1500 purposes. | The district complaint included an alternative takings claim on nearly identical operative facts, so § 1500 bars CFC jurisdiction. | § 1500 applies: the CFC lacked jurisdiction because a substantially identical suit was pending in district court when CFC action was filed. |
| Judicial takings claim premised on Fifth Circuit Quiet Title decision | Judicial takings claim valid and CFC can adjudicate whether the Fifth Circuit’s decision itself effected a taking. | CFC cannot review or overturn a final decision of an Article III court; adjudication would require collateral review. | CFC lacks jurisdiction to entertain a takings claim that requires scrutinizing the merits of a federal district/circuit court decision; judicial takings claim dismissed. |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Nebo Oil Co., 190 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1951) (interpreting Act 315 to render a particular servitude imprescriptible)
- United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973) (Act 315 could not be applied retroactively in certain federal‑acquisition contexts)
- United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17 (1958) (physical taking accrues when United States enters possession)
- Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949) (measure of just compensation tied to value at time of taking)
- United States v. Tohono O'odham Nation, 563 U.S. 307 (2011) (interpretation of § 1500 / substantial overlap of operative facts analysis)
- Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200 (1993) (§ 1500 bars CFC jurisdiction when another suit pending "for or in respect to" same claim)
- Central Pines Land Co. v. United States, 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001) (pre‑Act 315 servitudes subject to Louisiana prescription; factual parallel)
- Boise Cascade Corp. v. United States, 296 F.3d 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (CFC may decide threshold property‑interest issues in takings cases)
- Shinnecock Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (CFC cannot review merits of decisions rendered by Article III tribunals)