Petock v. Asante
268 P.3d 579
| Or. | 2011Background
- Petock filed a workers’ compensation claim after a 2002 knee injury at Asante; claim accepted.
- In 2005, Petock sustained a second knee injury and treated it as an aggravation of the 2002 injury; she pursued workers’ compensation benefits for aggravation.
- Petock later sought reinstatement and reemployment under ORS 659A.043 and ORS 659A.046, alleging Asante refused light-duty reemployment in 2005 and failed to reinstate in 2006.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to Asante, holding that reinstatement/reemployment rights expired three years after the 2002 injury.
- Court of Appeals reversed, holding a possible new and separate injury in 2005 could create a new three-year period, and remanded for fact-finding.
- This Court reviews de novo whether the 2005 injury could be a compensable injury under ORS 656.005(7)(a) and thus start a new reinstatement period; it affirms the Court of Appeals but with nuanced reasoning.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 2005 injury constitutes a new compensable injury | Petiock argues aggravation can be a compensable injury under ORS 659A.043. | Asante argues aggravation never constitutes a compensable injury. | No per se rule; fact-specific inquiry required. |
| Application of 'date of injury' to start new period | Date of injury should include a new compensable injury, not just the original. | Date of injury is the original compensable injury's date. | Three-year period runs from the compensable injury that gave rise to reinstatement rights. |
| Preclusion/record evidence for summary judgment | Court should treat 2005 as potentially new injury; not barred by issue preclusion. | Different grounds argued; evidence insufficient for summary judgment on 2005 as compensable injury. | Record presents a genuine issue of material fact; remand appropriate. |
| Whether the 2005 injury can be compensable when it combines with a preexisting condition | A second injury can be compensable if it is major contributing cause with preexisting condition. | Compensable injury requires a separate injury, not merely aggravated condition. | Both scenarios possible; depends on the major contributing cause and statutory definitions. |
Key Cases Cited
- Armstrong v. Rogue Federal Credit Union, 328 Or 154 (1998) (defines 'compensable injury' for ORS 659A.043(1))
- SAIF v. Walker, 330 Or 102 (2000) (aggravation standard; aggravation may be compensable under certain conditions)
- Outdoor Media Dimensions Inc. v. State of Oregon, 331 Or 634 (2001) (discusses right-to-affirmative grounds on summary judgment decisions)
- ZRZ Realty v. Beneficial Fire and Casualty, 349 Or 117 (2010) (affirmative defense burden and issue preclusion considerations)
- Keller v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc., 342 Or 23 (2006) (issue-preclusion considerations on summary judgment)