13 Cal. App. 5th 261
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2017Background
- Marline and Joseph Petitpas sued Exxon, Ford, Rossmoor and others alleging Marline developed mesothelioma from direct and "take-home" (secondary) asbestos exposure tied to Joseph's work (service stations, Ford vehicle repairs, and Rossmoor construction sites).
- Pretrial: court granted summary adjudication for Exxon on strict products liability and secondary-exposure claims; several defendants were dismissed or settled before or during trial; Rossmoor was nonsuited at trial.
- Trial evidence: Marline visited a Pomona Enco (Exxon) service bay in 1966–67 while Joseph performed brake/clutch/gasket work (some Ford vehicles); replacement parts were obtained from independent suppliers or a mobile brake service; Joseph later laundered clothing while married and did vehicle work at home.
- Jury findings: Exxon operated the Enco station, Marline was exposed there and that exposure was a substantial factor in risk; but jury unanimously found Exxon did not know or should have known of a condition creating an unreasonable risk; verdicts for Exxon and Ford overall, and nonsuit for Rossmoor.
- Appeals issues raised: (1) whether summary adjudication for Exxon on strict liability and take-home exposure was erroneous; (2) whether Rossmoor nonsuit on direct and secondary exposure was erroneous; (3) whether Ford jury instructions (design-defect scope and causation) were incorrect; (4) punitive damages summary adjudication as to Ford; (5) whether Exxon verdict lacked evidentiary support.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Summary adjudication of strict products liability against Exxon | Exxon was in the stream of commerce for asbestos-containing replacement parts sold/installed at Enco; its evidence did not disprove it | Enco merely provided repair services and obtained parts from independent suppliers/mobile brake service; not a seller/distributor in the stream of commerce | Affirmed — evidence showed Enco/Exxon acted as service provider, not a distributor/supplier whose role warranted strict liability |
| 2. Summary adjudication re: take-home (secondary) exposure against Exxon | Marline had close, sustained contact with Joseph (hugging, rides) — duty should extend beyond household members | Under Kesner duty extends only to household members; Marline was not a household member during relevant Enco visits | Affirmed — Kesner limits duty to household members, so no duty to Marline for take-home exposure at Pomona Enco |
| 3. Nonsuit as to Rossmoor (direct and secondary exposure) | Sufficient expert and lay testimony created triable issues that Rossmoor exposures (on sites and via Joseph) could have contributed to risk | Evidence showed Marline was not present during active construction, Joseph spent limited time on sites, and there was insufficient proof of contamination/transmission to Marline | Affirmed — causation evidence insufficient to let jury find Rossmoor caused Marline’s increased risk |
| 4. Ford: jury instruction limiting liability for parts not manufactured/supplied by Ford and causation instructions (CACI 430/435) | Ford-designed systems required asbestos linings; Ford liable for design defect or at least should have had asbestos-specific causation instruction only (CACI 435) | O'Neil bars liability for harm from another manufacturer’s part unless defendant’s product substantially contributed; giving both CACI 430 and 435 was appropriate given a premises defendant was also involved | Affirmed — Special Instruction (per O'Neil) correct; giving CACI 430 and 435 was not reversible error (if any error, harmless) |
| 5. Verdict for Exxon challenged as lacking evidence (knowledge/notice) | Uncontradicted evidence showed Exxon knew asbestos hazards and should have known service-station conditions posed risk to bystanders | Evidence of corporate/refinery knowledge did not prove knowledge of service-station risks to bystanders; defense experts contradicted causal/knowledge inferences | Affirmed — plaintiffs did not show uncontradicted evidence entitling them to judgment as a matter of law; reasonable contrary evidence existed |
Key Cases Cited
- Campbell v. Ford Motor Co., 206 Cal.App.4th 15 (Cal. Ct. App.) (held premises owner lacked duty to family members of on-site workers; later disapproved on take-home issue)
- Kesner v. Superior Court, 1 Cal.5th 1132 (Cal. 2016) (employer/owner duty to prevent take-home exposure extends only to household members)
- O'Neil v. Crane Co., 53 Cal.4th 335 (Cal. 2012) (manufacturer not liable for harm caused by another manufacturer's product unless defendant's product contributed substantially or defendant substantially participated in harmful combined use)
- Rutherford v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 16 Cal.4th 953 (Cal. 1997) (asbestos causation: plaintiff may prove exposure was a substantial factor by showing it increased risk of developing cancer)
- Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 25 Cal.4th 826 (Cal. 2001) (summary judgment burdens and allocation of proof)
- Hernandezcueva v. E.F. Brady Co., Inc., 243 Cal.App.4th 249 (Cal. Ct. App.) (stream-of-commerce analysis for parties that supply and install components; factual inquiry whether supplier role justifies strict liability)
- Monte Vista Development Corp. v. Superior Court, 226 Cal.App.3d 1681 (Cal. Ct. App.) (subcontractor that purchases fixtures to install is a services provider, not in stream of commerce)
- Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73 Cal.App.3d 917 (Cal. Ct. App.) (installer of seat belts held not in stream of commerce; nonsuit affirmed)