2021 CO 14
Colo.2021Background
- A.M. was born drug-exposed and placed with her paternal stepsister (Aunt); the parents were adjudicated dependent and neglected and given treatment plans.
- The People moved to terminate both parents’ rights, alleging noncompliance with plans, parental unfitness, and lack of feasible modification or less drastic alternatives.
- After a two-day hearing the trial court initially found termination would serve A.M.’s best interests but denied the motion because permanent custody to Aunt was a less drastic alternative.
- The court of appeals (first division) reversed and remanded, directing the trial court to decide whether permanent custody to Aunt was in the child’s best interests; on remand the trial court terminated both parents’ rights.
- A divided court of appeals (second appeal) reversed, adopting an “adequacy” standard: if a less drastic alternative would adequately meet the child’s needs, termination must be denied.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the court of appeals, holding the adequacy standard inconsistent with Colorado precedent, affirming that best interests governs, and clarifying that explicit less-drastic findings are unnecessary (though preferable).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (People) | Defendant's Argument (Father) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Standard for evaluating less-drastic alternatives (adequacy v. best interests) | Trial court must apply child’s best‑interests standard; an alternative must not only be adequate but must be in the child’s best interests | Courts should bar termination if any less‑drastic alternative adequately meets the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs ("adequacy" standard) | Best‑interests standard controls; adequacy alone is insufficient and conflicts with precedent — alternatives must be in the child’s best interests |
| 2. Whether trial courts must make express findings that no less‑drastic alternatives exist | Not required; consideration/elimination of alternatives is implicit in statutory criteria | Trial courts must make an explicit finding that no less‑drastic alternative exists before termination | Not required to make explicit findings, but it is better practice to do so; implicit consideration under statutory scheme suffices |
| 3. Due process: does adequacy standard better protect parental liberty? | Due process satisfied by clear‑and‑convincing proof of statutory factors and consideration of less‑drastic alternatives under best interests | Adequacy standard is necessary to protect parents’ fundamental liberty interest and avoid subjective best‑interests judgments | Due process does not require the adequacy standard; clear‑and‑convincing proof of statutory criteria plus best‑interests analysis satisfies due process |
| 4. Did the court of appeals misapply appellate review and substitute its judgment? | The court of appeals substituted its view for trial court’s factual findings and applied the wrong legal standard | Court of appeals correctly required protection of parental liberty via adequacy rule | Court of appeals erred: it applied the wrong legal standard and impermissibly substituted its judgment for the trial court; judgment reversed |
Key Cases Cited
- Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (termination requires fundamentally fair procedures and proof by clear and convincing evidence)
- Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (parents possess a protected liberty interest in childrearing)
- People in Interest of M.M., 726 P.2d 1108 (Colo. 1986) (trial court must consider and reject less‑drastic alternatives; such consideration is implicit in statutory criteria)
- In Interest of Baby A, 363 P.3d 193 (Colo. 2015) (recognizes parents’ liberty interest and relevant procedural safeguards)
- People in Interest of J.M.B., 60 P.3d 790 (Colo. App. 2002) (child’s best interests govern determination whether a placement short of termination is viable)
- C.S. v. People, 83 P.3d 627 (Colo. 2004) (statutory termination criteria imply consideration of less‑drastic alternatives)
- People in Interest of A.J.L., 243 P.3d 244 (Colo. 2010) (appellate deference to trial court findings on credibility and best‑interests)